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No 6, June 1991

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Reflections of a Sociologist on the Referendum

915D0020A Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE

ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 91

(signed to press 12 May 91) pp 3-9

[Article by Vladimir Savelyevich Komarovskiy, doctor of philosophical sciences and department head at the Scientific Research Institute on Experience of the Academy of Social Sciences Under the CPSU Central Committee. He is an author of our journal]

[Text] At present, we are pleased with the greater attention paid by the public to the accomplishments of domestic sociological science but we clearly do not pay sufficient attention to the fact that this "demand" for the results of sociological research conceals a number of "submerged rocks" which lie on the way of the normal functioning and development of sociology.

This has become particularly noticeable in line with the public opinion polls and the mass awareness research. It would be possible to name more than isolated instances when the results of the polls became a weapon in the clash between various political forces and the debate over them had a far from scientific character. Particularly indicative in this regard are the polls on the question of introducing private ownership of land in our nation. Debates have also developed over the wording of the question in a referendum of maintaining the integrity of the Union.

We also have been involved in this polemics. Being invited as an expert for one of the sessions of the Commission on the Referendum Under the Secretariat of the USSR Supreme Soviet, I voiced a number of critical judgments. These concerned the potential of the public to adequately interpret the sense of a question of such difficulty. In this context a question of a larger level arose: In our science, are there concrete data making it possible to judge the level of preparedness for the polls among our population at present? It must be admitted that such data are not available.

What has been said shows that the problem of the reliability of conclusions obtained on the basis of sociological information goes far beyond the questions of the honesty and professional preparation of the sociologists or even the influence of the researcher's ideological views concerning the interpretation of the research results. The solution to this is directly linked to the process of the methodological "self-understanding" of sociology as a science.

Let us halt on this question, having first of all discussed the problem of the linkage of sociological science and social changes.

An analysis of social science can, as is known, be approached from two sides: a) as a relatively independent and special system of knowledge having its own internal development patterns, category apparatus and so forth (in methodology this area is termed "internalism"); b) as an element of an integral social system within which it performs a certain purpose, solves a certain range of socially important problems and has its own status and social base.

As far as one can judge from the results of the recent World Sociology Congress (Madrid, 1990), at present the problems in the first of the designated approaches has been worked out in greater detail. As for the place and role of sociology in the system of the other social institutions of modern society, its functions and purpose, the conditions of functioning and so forth, these questions, in our view, as a whole have not been worked out with sufficient concreteness. For example, in the USSR there has been no significant research, empirical or theoretically generalizing, on the attitude toward sociology among various social and demographic groups in the population, or concerning the demands for sociological information in various management structures. Such gaps undoubtedly impede the development of sociology as a science. In particular, in working out the methods and procedures of sociological research, it is always essential to bear in mind that these occur not in a vacuum but rather in a definite society, a social milieu through the prism of which the general patterns of one or another method are refracted.

The importance of this factor is most apparent in the use of the poll method as here significant masses of the population are directly involved in the very research process. The level of their information, sociological preparation, the state of public opinion, the attitude toward sociological research generally, the focus of their interests and preferences, the notions of the possibilities of using sociological information by the social institutions in a society, the attitude toward these institutions themselves and the social status of a man—these are the objective factors which must not be ignored in working out the concrete methods and procedures of research, as they tell directly on the attitude of the public and the various groups to the poll, they are apparent in the conduct of the respondent during the procedure of conducting the sociological research and they largely determine the level of attention, sincerity, interest and even the nature of his replies.

The still rather widespread viewpoint of a poll as a type chiefly of psychological contact between the interviewer (questioner) and the respondent, in our view, does not conform to the present level in the development of sociological science as it removes the respondent from the context of his social ties and this does not happen in actuality. As has been shown by the experience of a number of studies conducted by us in the 1970s [1], in answering the questions of a poll (interview), each respondent to a greater or lesser degree was currently aware of the social importance of the research as a whole as well as his replies in particular. And this was not only in terms of himself but also the community with the interests of which he identified as well as even society as a whole. The situation of the poll was viewed by the respondent actually as a type of social interaction having consequences going beyond the limits of his personal interests, let alone the research situation. He realized his responsibility and this left an imprint on the nature of the replies.

Here it is essential to bear in mind that any significant changes in a social system lead ultimately to adequate changes in the situation of sociology in society, the attitude

toward it on the part of the various groups of the population and their desire and opportunity to participate in sociological research.

The changes which have commenced in the USSR have created a new political situation in the nation. Broad masses of the population have gained an opportunity to actually become involved in the running of the country and in the decision-taking processes; conditions are being created for manifesting the initiative of people, and scope is being opened up for the processes of the self-governing and self-managing of society. In society efforts are being taken to organize the mechanism for the free formation and disclosure of the interests and will of various groups. The roll and importance of public opinion are growing sharply.

Thus, new social ties and new mechanisms are being established for incorporating man in the life of society and the nature of relations is changing between the individual and the state, the individual and society and between the various social institutions. By the logic of development, social problem emerges in the forefront and this fundamentally changes the social status of sociological science and the attitude toward it. The respondent himself also changes.

Research conducted by us in 1983-1988 on the state of mass awareness in a number of the nation's regions in the same labor collectives (shops, brigades) [2], has shown that during the years of stagnation a number of permanent negative phenomena was formed in the awareness and psychology of the masses (these largely determined the state of awareness as a whole) and primarily such ones as social apathy and legal nihilism, conformism and a reticence to assume any responsibility whatever, economic illiteracy, a low level of constructiveness of thinking, conservatism, routine and dependence. All of this in a most direct manner told on the results and possibilities of sociological research.

In the first place, it was difficult to obtain sincere answers. Secondly, instead of a personal opinion the researcher frequently found newspaper slogans and stereotypes. It was extremely difficult to break through the declarative nature of the formed notions.

The social effect of poll research, as is known, is largely determined by the development in the public of constructive habits of thinking and these are particularly apparent in the replies to the "open" questions of the questionnaire and interviews which do not provide a previously prepared range of alternatives. The assembled data indicate that precisely this is largely lacking now. Thus, only 5 percent of the proposals voiced by the persons surveyed in 1983 on social questions, the questions of the functioning of socialist democracy on the spot and so forth, could be classified as among the professionally constructive, that is, offering concrete ways for resolving the question. Very often the people avoided answering acute questions or did not have their own viewpoint and generally far from often willingly participated in the research.

The polls of 1987-1988 showed significant positive shifts in mass awareness. The people had become more open and franker, they were not afraid to express their viewpoint, they had learned to take a more sober view of themselves and

what was happening around them, the horizons of their thinking had broadened and the feeling of civil responsibility had grown stronger.

Particularly noticeable changes have occurred in the sphere of political awareness and this was clearly apparent in the course of the held elections. According to the data obtained by us, in the large cities approximately only 5 percent (in the countryside and small towns noticeably more)¹ voters did not have any notion of what the people's deputy should be engaged in and voted in a completely unmotivated manner (for example, for the person who was at the head of the ballot). On the order of another 20 percent, although they did not know the election programs of their candidates, their biographies and so forth, did have a political instinct which allowed them to orient themselves more or less successfully. Almost one-half of the voters by the end of the campaign had enough information on the candidates and in one form or another participated in the putting up and discussion of the candidacies. This shows an unconditional rise in the level of voter competence. For example, in Moscow, 50 percent of the voters (absolutely first place) pointed out that their guide in voting was the following: the deputy was a political figure capable of carrying out state duties and possessing a vision of the ways to solve the problems of a general national nature.

An analysis of the course of the election campaign showed that for the first time the public was interested in procedural questions, it was very active in becoming familiar with the election law as it developed, and gradually acquired the skills of political activity and self-organization (the latter is one of the important achievements of the election campaign and the chief indicator for manifesting conditions for the democratization and formation of a civil society).

These processes underwent further development in the course of the work of the Congresses of USSR People's Deputies and the Republic Supreme Soviets. Millions of the nation's TV viewers were able to follow their work and this helped to reduce the degree of amorphousness and ambiguity in the state of public awareness and public opinion in the political sphere and this can be viewed as a prerequisite for the more active and consolidated actions of the public in the future. According to our data, public opinion is already sufficiently prepared for a pluralistic vision of the problems involved in the development of the nation and society and the ways for resolving these problems.

The elections to the local bodies (1990) appear, at first glance, to be a less persuasive indicator of positive shifts in mass awareness. Thus, according to the data obtained by us² in certain regions of the nation up to one-third of the voters made their choice of their candidate directly at the electoral precinct, in essence, without being aware of for what or for whom they were voting. Voter activeness also declined substantially. However, this does not provide grounds to assume that the level of their civil awareness, political culture and competence had declined. Here the drop in activeness and voter interest can be explained first of all by the sharp deterioration in the socioeconomic situation in the nation, by the ineffective work of the soviets and by the mass of organizational mistakes made during the election

campaign for the local bodies. For this reason, there are no grounds to dispute the general, undoubtedly positive trend for the change in mass awareness and which most directly is felt in the possibilities of the poll. A comparative analysis shows that the USSR population is presently very interested in sociological research, there is a broader range of problems on which the public can voice its opinion with sufficient competence, sincerity has risen as well as the ability to formulate one's thoughts independently and adequately.

As a consequence, greater opportunities have opened up for the sociologist to ask open questions making it possible to gain a notion not only about the views on the part of various groups of the population concerning various problems, but also their judgments concerning the ways for resolving these problems. At present, there are virtually no questions to which the public is reticent to reply due to the reason of the fear of negative consequences.

It is perfectly obvious that this positive trend in the changes of mass awareness is important not only for assessing the possibilities of the sociological polls but also the referendums as in many regards the given procedures are identical. This, in turn, makes it possible to conclude tentatively that the level of maturity in the political awareness of our population at present is sufficient for the nation to begin to hold referendums, for a majority of the population, in principle, is ready to participate in them with sufficient activeness, awareness and competence.

The given general conclusion certainly needs clarification over to just how broad is that range of problems and questions which at present could be put up in a referendum and obtain as a result of it a sufficiently mature answer from the people? Do the people want to participate in a referendum on one or another specific question and so forth? From general arguments, it is impossible to obtain an answer to these questions and for this reason we have moved on to setting out certain concrete data concerning the proposed referendums on private ownership of land and the future of the Union.

Let us point out ahead of time that the results of the All-Union Poll conducted in mid-December 1990 in 22 regions of the nation³ uniformly showed that a majority of the population had matured "morally" and in principle was ready to participate in the referendums. There were just a few of those against the use of this institution of direct democracy in the aims of resolving (or discussing) the most important questions for the life of the nation and the people. Even if we add to these the 17 percent of those questioned who found it difficult to answer the corresponding question of the questionnaire, the overall picture does not change.

Does this mean that on the level being analyzed here there will be no problems in conducting a referendum in the USSR generally and on the designated questions, in particular. Of course not. Indicative in this regard is the position of the USSR people's deputies who in a sample of over 600 persons were questioned during the work of the Fourth Congress.

In generally approving the conducting of a referendum on the two above-mentioned problems, many deputies at the

same time were very cautious of the idea of a referendum itself. The replies emphasize that the nation's public still does not possess experience in participating in referendums as well as sufficient knowledge and skills in the sphere of political conduct. The deputies propose to resort to a referendum only in rare instances and chiefly on local problems.

The first experience of the public's participation in referendums confirmed many of the fears of the deputies. For example, the residence of Odessa as a result of two referendums on the problems of the life in their city arrived at conclusions which largely actually contradicted one another. To put it mildly, there does not appear to be smooth sailing for the referendums on the questions of maintaining the integrity of the Union and on private ownership of land. Although according to the obtained data both referendums "have assembled a quorum" and the required majority of the population is ready to participate in them, nevertheless just 44 percent of those questioned put a referendum on the question of maintaining the integrity of the Union as among the primary ones, while only 28 percent called a referendum on private property as urgent. In truth, the questions of all other referendums taken together were mentioned by a smaller number of respondents. What is the reason for such a rather restrained attitude of the public toward the given referendums?

These reasons differ and lie on different planes. Among them are those which, according to our data, are due to the fact that a certain portion of the population still does not feel itself ready to make judgments on such complex and global problems. Arguing in favor of such a conclusion is the very fact that differences have been disclosed in the attitude among different groups of the public to a referendum. Thus, the intelligentsia (over one-half of those polled) was most actively in favor of a referendum on the question of maintaining the Union while the kolkhoz members and sovkhoz workers were less actively so (one out of three was in favor). On a referendum on the question of private ownership of land, the inhabitants of the Maritime Area voiced their opinion significantly more actively than the sample aggregate, as here the questions of ownership (because of the offered opportunity of creating free enterprise zones) had long been in the field of attention of the public. It may seem that our conclusions "do not fit" with the results of other studies, in particular with the poll taken by the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY and according to which an absolute majority uniformly favored the allowing of private ownership of land in the nation. However, in the first place, this is the judgment of the readers of the weekly and no one else. The establishing of real ideological pluralism in our nation has led to a situation where the political orientation of individual publications has begun to differ markedly from one another. Correspondingly, the orientations of the readers differ, although possibly not to the same degree. Secondly, the more active portion of the public replies to mail polls and this makes the possibility of extending the data of these polls to the nation's population as a whole evermore problematic. A third consideration. Often the basic arguments in the polemics which have developed over these referendums are the number of the population

favoring or opposing without establishing the adequate reflection of the concept of private ownership of land in the awareness of the respondents or just what a new Union might mean. As a result the ensuing interpretations of the results of the public opinion polls do not make it possible, in our view, to objectively assess the true state of the problem.

In the aim of shedding light on the essence of the matter, we conducted a small social study.⁴ From the obtained data, only one-half of those questioned in Vladimir Oblast could judge with sufficient qualification on the essence of private ownership of land. (In voting for private property, they understood as this any plots of land which could be owned by the citizens.) Another portion of those polled adhered to the viewpoint that private property could be only the dacha and farmstead plots (24 percent) or land allocated for individual development (21 percent). Confirmation of the insufficient understanding of the essence of this question on the part of the population can be seen from the fact that in pointing to the qualitative characteristics of private property, only one out of four stated that this was primarily the right to buy and sell, inherit, give away or mortgage land.

The comprehension among the Muscovites of the essence of the question of private ownership of land was marked by greater depth but not so much as to make these discrepancies fundamental. Equally important is the fact that a significant portion of the respondents was not certain that they would change their position in 2 or 3 years.

Without claiming universal importance for the conclusions from the conducted polls and viewing them as strictly tentative, nevertheless it is possible to point out that the population as yet does not have a clear understanding of the essence of the concept of private ownership of land and, consequently, there is no certainty that a referendum on the question of private ownership of the land would make it possible to ascertain the true positions of the voters and adequately interpret the referendum results.

Equally complicated is the situation involving a referendum on the question of the future Union. The results of the poll largely confirmed the doubts of specialists on the wording of the question submitted for referendum.

Thus, to our question "Do you consider that the question concerning the future of the USSR submitted for referendum has been given in a clear, precise form, does it not impose on you one or another given position (assessment, opinion) and do you completely understand its meaning?"

The replies of the respondents were distributed in the following manner (in the percent of those polled):

	Vladimir Oblast	Moscow
Yes	42.0	10.6
Partially yes, partially no	38.0	19.1
No, I do not feel so	20.0	70.2

For specialists professionally engaged in studying public opinion, clearly the proposed wording actually contains several questions.

What is the future Union? Among those polled there was no unity that in the future our nation should keep its previous name. In Vladimir Oblast, some 46 percent favored keeping it and in Moscow, just a quarter of those polled; the figures, respectively, for the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics was 24 percent and 43 percent. The remainder favored a different name or limited themselves to not using the words "socialist" and "soviet."

The second question was the "renewal of the federation." Many of those polled had a poor understanding or simply found it difficult to determine for themselves just what was meant by a 'Union....' as a renewed federation. The absence of an identity between the principles proposed by the Constitution and those actually existing for the functioning of our state did not encourage any greater confidence in the declared changes. Everyone recognized their necessity but not everyone was convinced of the feasibility of carrying them out.

In our public affairs, disputes on the essence of renewing the federal system of the Union are focused chiefly around the relationship between the center and the republics as well as human rights.

It is important to emphasize that for a majority of the respondents, the solution to questions concerning human rights in the future Union was of greater importance than the distribution of powers between the center and the republics. Thus, some 47 percent of those polled in Vladimir Oblast and 53 percent of the Moscow residents, in answering the question: "What is most important for you in the future Union?" marked the point "it makes no difference where power is concentrated, it is important that human rights be observed regardless of the place of residence or nationality"; respectively, 20 and 32 percent of those polled favored the view that "the main thing is there be no dictating of terms by the Center and a majority of questions be settled on the republic level"; 29 percent in Vladimir Oblast and 17 percent in Moscow pointed out that "it is important that the Union have a strong center, otherwise there will be no order in the nation."

Thus, the question in the proposed wording has a diverse (in the understanding of the respondents) interpretation and the individual components of it in their mind are not always adequately linked. Correspondingly, in favoring a position "for" or "against," the participants in a referendum will quite probably have different component wordings of the question in mind. Consequently, it will be hard to offer a single interpretation for the results of the nationwide voting.

The impression is created that the politicians are not only taking a decision on whether or not to hold a referendum as this undoubtedly is within their competence but are also setting the wording of the question "offhandedly." In our view, linguists are indispensable here. An analysis by these and other specialists of the wording of the question and the principles for organizing the referendum should be carried out openly and publically so that all participants in the discussion adhering to different viewpoints and not just those who are closer to "those in power" can defend their position. This is the first condition for turning a referendum

into an important factor for consolidating the nation's peoples. Of course, it is essential to conduct regular measurements of the state of public opinion in defining the future of the Union as these would make it possible to assess the degree of an adequate understanding by the various strata of the population of the essence of the questions requiring a referendum. This would make it possible to make the appropriate adjustments in the explanatory and propaganda campaign for nationwide voting on major questions.

Footnotes

1. The poll was conducted in eight regions of the nation. The sample was constructed on the basis of the voter lists. More than 4,000 persons were questioned [3].
2. In four regions of the nation, more than 5,000 persons were polled according to the voter lists. The polls were conducted before the start of the election campaign, in the course of it and after the concluding of the voting.
3. The Baltic, Transcaucasus and Moldavia were not involved in the analysis and for this reason the corresponding data are lacking or because it was possible to poll only the Russian-speaking population. The author collective of the given study included Doctors of Philosophical Sciences Ye.G. Andryushenko, I.V. Bestuzhev-Lada, V.S. Komarovskiy and V.S. Korobeynikov. The information was assembled by co-workers at the Main Editorial Offices for Letters and Sociological Research Under the USSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Radio and TV].
4. On 19-20 January 1991, in Vladimir Oblast, a questionnaire poll was conducted for 100 oblast inhabitants and in Moscow, telephone interviews were taken for 47 subscribers. Although a sample of such a scale and geography cannot claim to be representative, nevertheless the results of the research provide enough grounds for conclusions on the understanding by the public of the essence of the problems touched on in the referendum. The research was conducted jointly with M.Kh. Musin.

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GULAG (Historical Sociological Aspect)

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[Article by Viktor Nikolayevich Zemskov, candidate of historical sciences and senior science associate at the Institute of USSR History Under the USSR Academy of Sciences. He is a permanent author of our journal]

[Text] The aim of the current article is to show the authentic statistics for the prisoners of the GULAG [Main Administration for Corrective Labor Camps] a significant portion of which has already been given in the articles by A.N. Dugin and V.F. Nekrasov as well as in our article in the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY [1].

Regardless of the presence of these articles which give the number of GULAG prisoners which corresponds to the truth and has been confirmed in documents, the Soviet and foreign public in its mass as before is under the influence of statistical figures which have been made up and do not correspond to the historical truth and are to be found in the works of both foreign authors (R. Conquest, S. Cohen and others) as well as in publications by a number of Soviet researchers (R.A. Medvedev, V.A. Chalikova and others). In the works of all these authors, the discrepancy with the true statistics never favors an understating but exclusively is only toward a great exaggeration. The impression is created that the authors compete with one another to amaze the readers with figures which, so to speak, become more and more astronomic.

For example, here is what has been written by S. Cohen (referring to the book by R. Conquest "The Great Terror" published in 1968 in the United States): "...By the end of 1939, the number of prisoners in the prisons and separate concentration camps rose to 9 million persons (in comparison with 30,000 in 1928 and 5 million in 1933-1935)" [2]. In actuality, in January 1940, the GULAG camps held 1,334,408 prisoners, the GULAG colonies had 315,584 and the prisons had 190,266 persons. At that time, as a total the camps, colonies and prisons had 1,850,258 prisoners (Tables 1 and 2), that is, the statistical data given by R. Conquest and S. Cohen have been exaggerated by almost 5-fold.

Table 1: Number of GULAG Prisoners (as of 1 January of Each Year) [5]

Years	In Corrective Labor Camps (ITL)	Including Condemned for Counterrevolutionary Crimes	Same in %	In Corrective Labor Colonies (ITK)	Total
1934	510,307	135,190	26.5	—	510,307
1935	725,483	118,256	16.3	240,259	965,742
1936	839,406	105,849	12.6	457,088	1,296,494
1937	820,881	104,826	12.8	375,488	1,196,369

Table 1: Number of GULAG Prisoners (as of 1 January of Each Year) [5] (Continued)

Years	In Corrective Labor Camps (ITL)	Including Condemned for Counterrevolutionary Crimes	Same in %	In Corrective Labor Colonies (ITK)	Total
1938	996,367	185,324	18.6	885,203	1,881,570
1939	1,317,195	454,432	34.5	355,243	1,672,438
1940	1,344,408	444,999	33.1	315,584	1,659,992
1941	1,500,524	420,293	28.7	429,205	1,929,729
1942	1,415,596	407,988	29.6	361,447	1,777,043
1943	983,974	345,397	35.6	500,208	1,484,182
1944	663,594	268,861	40.7	516,225	1,179,819
1945	715,505	289,351	41.2	745,171	1,460,677
1946	746,871	333,883	59.2	956,224	1,703,095
1947	808,839	427,653	54.3	912,704	1,721,543
1948	1,108,057	416,156	38.0	1,091,478	2,199,535
1949	1,216,361	420,696	34.9	1,140,324	2,356,685
1950	1,416,300	578,912*	22.7	1,145,051	2,561,351
1951	1,533,767	475,976	31.0	994,379	2,528,146
1952	1,711,202	480,766	28.1	793,312	2,504,514
1953	1,727,970	465,256	26.9	740,554	2,468,524

* In camps and colonies.

Table 2: Number of Prisoners in USSR Prisons [6]

(Data for Middle of Each Month)

Years	January	March	May	July	September	December
1939	350,538	281,891	225,242	185,514	178,258	186,278
1940	190,266	195,582	196,028	217,819	401,146	434,871
1941	487,739	437,492	332,936	216,223	229,217	247,404
1942	277,992	298,081	262,464	217,327	201,547	221,669
1943	235,313	237,246	248,778	196,119	170,767	171,708
1944	155,213	177,657	191,309	218,245	267,885	272,486
1945	279,969	272,113	269,526	263,819	191,930	235,092
1946	261,500	278,666	268,117	253,757	259,078	290,984
1947	306,163	323,492	326,369	360,878	349,035	284,642
1948	275,850	256,771	239,612	228,031	228,258	230,614

R. Conquest and S. Cohen are echoed by the Soviet researcher V.A. Chalikova who writes: "Based on various data, the figures show that in 1937-1950, there were 8-12 million persons in the camps occupying enormous expanses" [3]. V.A. Chalikova gives a maximum figure of 12 million prisoners in the GULAG (evidently the concept of the "camp" for her includes also the colonies) on a certain date, but in reality over the period of 1934-1953, the maximum number of prisoners in the GULAG reached on 1 January 1950 was 2,561,351 persons (see Table 1). Consequently, V.A. Chalikova, in following R. Conquest and S. Cohen, exaggerates the actual number of GULAG prisoners by approximately 5-fold.

N.S. Khrushchev also did his bit to confuse the question of statistics concerning GULAG prisoners and he, clearly in the aim of exaggerating his role as the liberator of the victims of the Stalinist repressions, wrote in his memoirs: "...When Stalin died, there were up to 10 million persons in the camps" [4]. In actuality, on 1 January 1953, the GULAG held 2,468,524 prisoners: 1,727,970 in the camps and 740,554 in the colonies (see Table 1). The TsGAOR SSSR [Central State Archives of the October Revolution] holds copies of reports from the leadership of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] to N.S. Khrushchev giving the precise number of prisoners, including at the moment of the death of I.V. Stalin. Consequently, N.S.

Khrushchev was perfectly informed of the actual number of GULAG prisoners and intentionally exaggerated this by 4-fold.

The existing articles concerning the repressions of the 1930s to the beginning of the 1950s, as a rule, contain distorted, greatly exaggerated data concerning the number of persons condemned on political grounds or, as this was officially termed at that time, for "counterrevolutionary crimes," that is, under the infamous Article 58 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and under the appropriate articles of the criminal codes of the other Union republics. This also concerns the data given by R.A. Medvedev on the scope of the repressions in 1937-1938. Here is what he has written: "In 1937-1938, according to my figures, from 5 to 7 million persons were repressed: around a million party members and around a million former party members as a result of the party purges in the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s, while the remaining 3-5 million persons were nonparty persons belonging to all strata of the population. A majority of those arrested in 1937-1938 was in corrective labor camps a dense network of which covered the entire nation" [7].

If one were to believe R.A. Medvedev, the number of prisoners in the GULAG in 1937-1938 should be increased by several million persons, however this was not observed. From 1 January 1937 through 1 January 1938, the number of GULAG prisoners rose from 1,196,369 to 1,881,570, and by 1 January 1939, had declined to 1,672,438 persons (see Table 1). In 1937-1938, in the GULAG there actually was a burst in the number of prisoners, but by several hundred thousand and not by several million. This was natural, since in reality the number of persons condemned for political grounds (for "counterrevolutionary crimes") in the USSR over the period from 1921 through 1953, that is, over the 33 years, was around 3.8 million persons. The assertions of R.A. Medvedev that some 5-7 million persons were repressed in just 1937-1938 did not correspond to the truth. The statement by the Chairman of the USSR KGB [State Security Committee] V.A. Kryuchkov that not more than a million persons had been arrested in 1937-1938 corresponds fully with the current GULAG statistics studied by us and relating to the second half of the 1930s.

In February 1954, a report was prepared for N.S. Khrushchev and this was signed by the USSR General Procurator R. Rudenko, the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs S. Kruglov and the USSR Minister of Justice K. Gorshenin. This gave the number of persons condemned for counterrevolutionary crimes over the period from 1921 through February 1954. As a total during this period, some 3,777,380 persons had been condemned by the Collegium of the OGPU [United State Political Administration], by the "troykas" [three-man tribunals] of the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs], by the Special Conference of the NKVD, by the Military Collegium, by the judges and military tribunals; this included 642,980 who were given the harshest penalty, 2,369,220 who were to be imprisoned in camps and prisons for a term of from 25 years and less, and 765,180 who were sentenced to exile and banishment. It was pointed out that of the total number of

persons arrested for counterrevolutionary crimes, approximately 2.9 million persons had been condemned by the OGPU Collegium, by the NKVD "troykas" and by the Special Conference of the NKVD (that is, by extrajudiciary bodies) and 877,000 by courts, military tribunals, the Special Collegium and Military Collegium. At present, the report stated, the camps and prisons hold 467,946 prisoners condemned for counterrevolutionary crimes and, in addition, 62,462 persons are in exile after serving their sentence.

This same document pointed out that the Special Conference set up under the USSR NKVD on the basis of the decree of the USSR TsIK [Central Executive Committee] and the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] of 5 November 1934 and which existed until 1 September 1953 had condemned 442,531 persons, including 10,101 condemned to the harshest penalty, 360,921 to imprisonment, 67,539 to exile and banishment (within the nation) and 3,970 persons to other punishments (time spent in custody, exiling abroad and forced medical treatment). A predominant majority of those whose cases were examined by the Special Conference of the NKVD was condemned for counterrevolutionary crimes.

In the initial version of the report compiled in December 1953, when the number of persons condemned for counterrevolutionary crimes and present in places of incarceration was 474,950 persons, the geography was given for the location of 400,296 prisoners: 95,899 in the Komi ASSR (and, in addition, 10,121 in Pechorlag [Pechora Camp Administration], 57,989 (including 56,423 in Karaganda Oblast) in the Kazakh SSR, 52,742 in Khabarovsk Kray, 47,053 in Irkutsk Oblast, 33,233 in Krasnoyarsk Kray, 17,104 in the Mordovian ASSR, 15,832 in Molotov Oblast, 15,422 in Omsk Oblast, 14,453 in Sverdlovsk Oblast, 8,403 in Kemerovo Oblast, 8,210 in Gorkiy Oblast, 7,854 in the Bashkir ASSR, 6,344 in Kirov Oblast, 4,936 in Kuybyshev Oblast, and 4,701 persons in Yaroslavl Oblast. The remaining 74,654 political prisoners were in other krais, oblasts and republics (Magadan Oblast, Primorskiy Kray, the Yakut ASSR and elsewhere).

This same version of the report stated that persons at the end of 1953 in exile and banishment and who were former prisoners condemned for counterrevolutionary crimes resided as follows: 30,575 in Krasnoyarsk Kray, 12,465 in Kazakhstan, 10,276 in the Far North, 3,880 in the Komi ASSR, 3,850 in Novosibirsk Oblast and 1,416 persons in other regions [8].

It must be emphasized that from the above-quoted official state document it follows that over the period from 1921 through 1953, less than 7,000 persons of those arrested for political reasons were sentenced to the severest punishment [death]. In this context we consider it our duty to repudiate the statement by the former member of the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee and the Commission to Investigate the Murder of S.M. Kirov and the Political Court Trials of the 1930s O.G. Shatunovskaya who, in referring to a certain document of the USSR KGB which subsequently supposedly disappeared mysteriously, has written: "...From 1 January 1935 through 22 June 1941, 19,840,000 'enemies of the people' were arrested. Of this

number, 7 million were executed. A majority of the survivors perished in the camps" [9].

In this information, O.G. Shatunovskaya has made a more than 10-fold exaggeration of both the scope of the repressions and the number of persons executed. She also asserts

that a majority of the survivors (one must assume, 7-10 million persons) perished in the camps. We have available completely accurate information that over the period from 1 January 1934 through 31 December 1947, 963,766 prisoners died in the corrective labor camps of the GULAG and this number includes not only the "enemies of the people" but also ordinary criminals (Table 3).

Table 3:

	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939
On 1 January	510,307	725,483	839,406	820,881	996,367	1,317,195
Total arrivals including:	593,702	524,328	626,069	884,811	1,036,165	749,647
From NKVD Camps	100,389	67,265	157,355	211,486	202,721	348,417
From other places of incarceration	445,187	409,663	431,442	636,749	803,007	383,994
From escapes	46,752	45,988	35,891	35,460	22,679	9,838
Other	1,374	1,412	1,381	1,116	7,758	7,398
Total departures* including:	378,526	410,405	644,594	709,325	715,337	722,434
To NKVD Camps	103,002	72,190	170,484	214,607	240,466	347,444
To other places of incarceration	17,169	28,976	23,826	43,916	55,790	74,882
Released	147,272	211,035	369,544	364,437	279,966	223,622
Died	26,295	28,328	20,595	25,376	90,546	50,502
Escaped	83,490	67,493	58,313	58,264	32,033	12,333
Other losses	1,298	2,383	1,832	2,725	16,536	13,651
Present on 31 December	725,483	839,406	820,881	996,367	1,317,195	1,344,408

* For 1942 and 1945, the statistics on the losses from the camp prisoners of GULAG is incomplete.—Author's note.

Movement of Camp Population of GULAG [10]

1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947
1,344,408	1,500,524	1,415,596	983,974	663,594	715,506	600,897	808,839
1,158,402	1,343,663	806,047	477,175	379,589	432,917	636,188	748,620
498,399	488,964	246,273	114,152	48,428	59,707	172,844	121,633
644,927	840,712	544,583	355,728	326,928	361,121	461,562	624,345
8,839	6,528	4,984	3,074	1,839	953	1,203	1,599
6,237	7,459	10,207	4,221	2,394	2,136	579	1,043
1,002,286	1,428,591	1,221,905	797,555	327,677	555,524	428,246	449,402
563,338	540,205	252,174	140,756	64,119	96,438	182,647	153,899
57,213	135,537	186,577	140,093	39,303	70,187	99,332	58,782
316,825	624,276	509,538	336,153	152,131	336,750	115,700	193,886
46,665	100,997	248,877	166,967	60,948	43,848	18,154	35,668
11,813	10,592	11,822	6,242	3,586	2,196	2,642	3,779
6,432	16,984	12,917	7,344	7,590	6,105	9,771	2,388
1,500,524	1,415,596	983,974	663,594	715,506	600,897	808,839	1,108,057

The dynamics of the movement of the GULAG camp prisoners over the period from 1934 through 1947 and including such indicators as mortality rate, escapes, capture and return of escapees, release from imprisonment and so forth is given in Table 3. In addition, Table 4 shows

the ratio of persons condemned by the extrajudiciary and judiciary bodies among prisoners in the GULAG camps in the period from 1934 through 1941. Unfortunately, we do not possess analogous statistics for the persons imprisoned and held in the GULAG colonies.

Table 4: Ratio Between Those Condemned by the Special Conference of the NKVD Bodies, Judges and Tribunals Among Camp Prisoners of GULAG (on 1 January of Each Year) [11]

Condemned	Years							
	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941*
By Special Conference bodies:								
Number of persons	215,489	299,337	282,712	253,652	496,191	782,414	732,702	566,309
% of total number	42.2	41.3	33.7	30.9	49.8	59.4	54.5	38.7
Including:								
By the Special Conference:								
Number of persons					36,865	109,327	126,374	120,148
% of total number					3.7	8.3	9.4	8.2
By "special troykas":								
Number of persons						306,906	341,479	252,678
% of total number						23.3	25.4	17.2
By courts and tribunals:								
Number of persons	294,818	426,146	556,694	567,300	500,176	534,781	611,706	858,448
% of total number	52.8	58.7	66.3	69.1	50.2	40.6	45.5	58.6

* In 1941, the figures for this group did not include 75,767 camp prisoners of the GULAG.—Author's note.

As of 1 March 1940, the GULAG consisted of 53 camps (including camps engaged in railroad construction) with numerous camp departments, 425 corrective labor colonies (including 170 industrial, 83 agricultural and 172 "contracting," that is, employed at construction sites and facilities of other departments) and united by the oblast, kray and republic departments of the corrective labor colonies (OITK) and 50 colonies for juveniles. From mid-1935 to the beginning of 1940, some 155,506 juveniles from 12 to 18 years of age passed through the juvenile colonies, and this included 68,927 convicted persons and 86,579 persons not convicted of crime. In March 1940, within the GULAG system there were 90 "youth homes" (in them were 4,595 children) the mothers of whom had been imprisoned [11].

In terms of the nature of crime, the GULAG prisoners were distributed in the following manner (on 1 March 1940) for counterrevolutionary activity 28.7 percent, for particularly dangerous crimes against the authorities 5.4 percent, for hooliganism, speculation and other crimes against the authorities 12.4 percent, theft 9.7 percent, official and economic crimes 8.9 percent, crimes against the individual 5.9 percent, theft of socialist property 1.5 percent and other crimes 27.5 percent. The total contingent of prisoners held in the GULAG ITL [corrective labor camp] and ITK [corrective labor colony] was set, according to the data of the centralized registration on 1 March 1940, at 1,668,200

persons. Of this number, 352,000 were held in the ITK, including 192,000 in the industrial and agricultural ITK and 160,000 persons in the "contractual" ITK [ibid.].

In the GULAG, the only exception to the rule that each prisoner should work was the sick and those judged unfit for labor (in March 1940, there were 73,000 of these). One of the GULAG documents in 1940 pointed out that the expenditures related to the support of prisoners who are sick or judged unfit for work "were a heavy burden on the GULAG budget" [ibid.].

In March 1940, in the GULAG in first place in terms of the proportional number were persons convicted for a period of from 5 to 10 years (38.4 percent), in second place from 3 to 5 years (35.5 percent), in third place was under 3 years (25.2 percent) and over 10 years with 0.9 percent. The age make-up of the GULAG prisoners (on 1 March 1940) was: 1.2 percent under the age of 18, 9.3 percent from 18 to 21 years, 63.6 percent from 22 to 40 years, 16.2 percent from 41 to 50 years, and 9.7 percent over the age of 50. On 1 January 1941, in the ITL there were 4,627 prisoners over the age of 70 [ibid.]. On 1 January 1939, the GULAG camp prisoners included 63.05 percent Russians, 13.81 percent Ukrainians, 3.40 percent Belorussians, 1.89 percent Tatars, 1.86 percent Uzbeks, 1.50 percent Jews, 1.41 percent Germans, 1.30 percent Kazakhs, 1.28 percent Poles, 0.89 percent Georgians, 0.84 percent Armenians, 0.71 percent Turkmen and 8.06 percent others (Table 5).

Table 5: Nationality of Camp Prisoners of GULAG in 1939-1941 (as of 1 January of Each Year) [12]

Nationality	Years		
	1939	1940	1941
Russians	830,491	820,089	884,574
Ukrainians	181,905	196,283	189,146
Belorussians	44,785	49,743	52,064

Table 5: Nationality of Camp Prisoners of GULAG in 1939-1941 (as of 1 January of Each Year) [12] (Continued)

Nationality	Years		
	1939	1940	1941
Georgians	11,723	12,099	11,109
Armenians	11,064	10,755	11,302
Azeris	no information	10,800	9,996
Kazakhs	17,123	20,166	19,185
Turkmen	9,352	9,411	9,689
Uzbeks	24,499	26,888	23,154
Tajiks	4,347	5,377	4,805
Kirghiz	2,503	2,688	2,726
Tatars	24,894	28,232	28,542
Bashkirs	4,874	5,380	5,560
Buryats	1,581	2,700	1,937
Jews	19,758	21,510	31,132
Germans	18,572	18,822	19,120
Poles	16,860	16,133	29,457
Finns	2,371	2,750	2,614
Latvians	4,742	5,400	4,870
Lithuanians	1,050	1,344	1,245
Estonians	2,371	2,720	2,781
Romanians	395	270	329
Iranians	no information	134	1,107
Afghans	263	280	310
Mongols	35	70	58
Chinese	3,161	4,033	3,025
Japanese	50	80	119
Koreans	2,371	2,800	2,108
Other*	76,055	67,451	148,460
TOTAL	1,317,195	1,344,408	1,500,524

* For 1939, the number of other also includes Azeris and Iranians.—Author's note.

Very indicative are the data concerning the educational level of the GULAG camp prisoners in 1934-1941 (Table 6). Over the period from 1934 through 1941, the proportional amount of persons with a higher education increased by 3-fold, and those with a secondary education by almost 2-fold. Such a significant increase in the proportional amount of prisoners with a higher and secondary education occurred regardless of a simultaneous increase in the number of persons with an inferior education, little-literate and illiterate. For example, the number of little-literate

persons among the camp prisoners increased from 217,390 in 1934 to 413,122 in 1941, that is, by almost 2-fold but their proportional amount in the total composition of the ITL prisoners over this period declined from 42.6 percent to 28.3 percent. The number of prisoners with a higher education in 1934-1941 increased by more than 8-fold, and by 5-fold for those with a secondary education and this caused a rise in their proportional amount in the overall composition of the camp prisoners.

Table 6: Educational Level of Camp Prisoners of GULAG in 1934-1941 (as of 1 January of Each Year) [13]

Education	Years							
	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941
Higher:								
Number of persons	3,572	4,936	6,799	8,619	10,960	22,395	24,199	30,721
% of total number	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.7	1.8	2.1
Secondary:								
Number of persons	28,577	47,025	62,284	72,648	82,698	119,864	133,096	156,585
% of total number	5.6	6.5	7.4	8.9	8.3	9.1	9.9	10.7
Lower:								
Number of persons	199,530	316,779	388,813	404,776	500,176	661,232	666,826	758,077
% of total number	39.1	43.7	46.3	49.3	50.2	50.2	49.6	51.8
Poorly literate:								
Number of persons	217,390	271,830	300,675	266,704	316,844	400,744	407,355	413,122
% of total number	42.6	37.5	35.8	32.4	31.8	30.5	30.3	28.3
Illiterate:								
Number of persons	61,238	84,913	80,835	68,134	85,689	112,960	112,932	104,872
% of total number	12.0	11.6	9.7	8.4	8.6	8.5	8.4	7.1

These data show that the numbers and proportional amount of the intelligentsia grew more rapidly within the camp prisoners. The mistrust, disdain and even hate for the intelligentsia were a common trait of the communist leaders. Practice has shown that having acquired unlimited power, they are simply unable to refrain from the temptations of humiliating the intelligentsia. Here the method of humiliating the intelligentsia in Maoist China involving being sent for "labor re-education" into agriculture, can be termed relatively humane. Another communist leader, Pol Pot (who ruled in Cambodia in 1975-1979) acted more "radically" in physically exterminating virtually all the intelligentsia of his nation. The Stalinist version of humiliating the intelligentsia and consisting in dispatching a portion of it to the GULAG on the basis of made up or fabricated accusations held as it were an intermediate position between the Maoist and Pol Pot versions. The unrepressed portion of the intelligentsia was presented with a form of humiliation in the form of "ideological hidings" or guiding and directing instructions "from above" on how it must think, create, respect "leaders" and so forth.

On 15 July 1939, the Order of the USSR NKVD No 0168 was issued and according to this the prisoners guilty of disrupting camp life and production were to be turned over to the courts. Prior to 20 April 1940, on the basis of this order, the Chekist operational departments had held liable and turned over to the courts some 4,033 persons, and of this number 210 were sentenced to the supreme penalty (in truth, the death penalty for a portion of them was later replaced by imprisonment for a period from 10 to 15 years) [ibid.].

In 1940, the centralized files of GULAG reflected the corresponding data for almost 8 million persons, including both persons who had gone through isolation in previous years as well as those currently in imprisonment [ibid.].

Along with the isolation bodies, the GULAG system included the so-called "corrective works buros" (BIR) the task of which was not to isolate the convicts but rather provide for the carrying out of the court sentences against persons sentenced to serve in corrective labor without incarceration. In March 1940, registered with the GULAG BIRs were 312,800 persons condemned to corrective labor without incarceration. Of this number 97.3 percent worked at the place of his basic job and 2.7 percent in other places, assigned by the NKVD bodies [ibid.].

Several months later, the number of this category of convicts rose sharply and this was a consequence of the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 26 June 1940 "On Converting to an 8-hour Workday, a 7-day Workweek and Preventing Unauthorized Absences by Workers and Employees From Enterprises and Institutions" [14] and this introduced criminal liability for spontaneously leaving the enterprises and institutions, for absences, for being 21 minutes late to work and so forth. A larger portion of these "ukase" prisoners was sentenced to corrective labor at the place of their main job for a period up to 6 months with the withholding of up to 25 percent of their wages.

By the start of the Great Patriotic War, there were 1,264,000 persons sentenced to corrective labor without incarceration registered with the GULAG BIRs. Among these persons convicted under the Ukase of 26 June 1940 comprised a predominant majority. For example, as of 1 December 1944, as a total at that time there were 770,000 persons convicted of various crimes to corrective labor without incarceration, including 570,000, or 74 percent, under the Ukase of 26 June 1940 [15].

During the prewar years, the death rate among the GULAG prisoners showed a noticeable tendency to drop. In 1939, in the camps this held on a level of 3.29 percent of the annual contingent and in the colonies, it was 2.30

percent; this was almost 2-fold below the death rate in the previous years (in 1937-1938, in the camps it was 5.5-5.7 percent of the annual contingent). In the reports from the GULAG leadership in 1939-1941, the main reason for the drop in the death rate of the prisoners was given as an improvement in their medical services, including extensive antiepidemic measures [ibid.].

Table 2 shows the dynamics of the number of prisoners in the USSR prisons in 1939-1948. For arrested persons prison was ordinarily a temporary stop, and after the court and the handing down of a sentence in their mass they were sent to the GULAG camps and colonies. Only an insignificant portion of the persons arrested were sentenced to serving their punishment in prisons. From Table 2 it can be seen that the maximum number of prisoners in the prisons in 1939-1948 occurred at the turn of 1940-1941. This occurred for two main reasons. In the first place, the recent annexation of the Baltic, the Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia, the Right-Bank Moldavia and Northern Bukovina naturally caused an increase in the contingents going to prison. Secondly, the transit prisons at that time were overfilled with persons convicted under the Ukases of 26 June and 10 August 1940. According to the Ukase of 26 June 1940, a smaller portion of the violators was to be sentenced to imprisonment from 2 to 4 months, but all the same there were hundreds of thousands of them. On 10 August 1940, two ukases had been promulgated: on responsibility for producing poor quality and rejected products and on the review by people's judges without involvement of the people's chairman of cases involving absences and unauthorized leave from the enterprises. As a result, according to the data on 1 December 1940, with a prison capacity of 234,000 persons, they held almost 462,000 prisoners (Table 7).

Table 7: Presence of Prisoners in USSR Prisons (as of 1 December 1940) [16]

Categories of Prisoners	Number
Total	461,683
Including:	
Under investigation	108,240
Including:	
By bodies of GUGB [Main Administration for State Security] of the Special Conference of the NKVD	61,011
By bodies of rayon police commission	47,229
Registered with procurator	32,717
Registered with courts	43,382
Condemned	271,117
Including:	
Under Ukase of 26 June 1940	83,223
Under Ukase of 10 August 1940	49,733
Other condemned	138,161
(Including under appeal)	81,912

Transit-exile	6,227
Movement of condemned to camps and colonies from 20 November through 1 December 1940	59,493
Including:	
Condemned under Ukases of 26 June and 10 August 1940	29,160
Other	30,333

From the GULAG documents it is very hard to break out the reverse flow in 1939 which A.I. Solzhenitsyn has written of as follows: "The reverse release of 1939 was an improbable case in the history of the Bodies, a blotch on their history! But, incidentally, this counterflow was small, around 1 or 2 percent of those taken previously...." [17]. As a total in 1939, some 327,400 persons were released from the GULAG (223,600 from the camps and 103,800 from the colonies), but in the given instance these figures mean little as there were no instructions as to what the percentage was among them of "enemies of the people" released ahead of time and rehabilitated. We know that on 1 January 1941, in Kolyma there were 34,000 released camp members, of which 3,000 (8.8 percent) had been fully rehabilitated [18].

A.I. Solzhenitsyn is certainly right in saying that the 1939 counterflow was an unprecedented instance in the history of the NKVD. The local authorities and the NKVD bodies were put under conditions where they continuously, every day and every hour, had to "wage a class fight." There was a sort of competition in disclosing and disarming the "enemies of the people." Here a lag in this competition could have the most lamentable consequences for the executors of this dirty undertaking, as for this reason they themselves could be considered among the "enemies of the people." Under these conditions for the official bodies it was of no significance whether the given person was guilty or innocent. The main thing was to arrest a significant number of "secret enemies" and thereby show that they, the official bodies, were supposedly actively "fighting the class enemy." Such activities of the NKVD, particularly during the period of 1937-1938, were exceptionally monstrous and immoral, but according to the notions established in the 1920s and 1930s on the "laws of the class struggle," anything that led to the rapid elimination of the class enemy was considered moral.

But even from the stand of these "laws of class struggle," the results of the hunting of the NKVD bodies for "secret enemies" was almost a complete sham. Later, during the war, it was to become clear that tens of thousands of persons who had always fostered a hate for the Soviet social and state system and who dreamed of mass retribution against the communists and this caused them to become active supporters of the Nazi invaders, in 1937-1938 avoided arrest for the very reason that they did not cause any particular suspicion among the NKVD bodies due to their feigned "loyalty." In other words, it required nothing from the true secret enemies to wrap the supervigilant bodies around their finger. At the same time, the GULAG was stuffed full of persons loyal to the Communist Party and Soviet power and who during the war in their letters to

various authorities had asked that only one service be rendered to them, that they be sent to the front, to be allowed to defend the motherland, the ideals of Great October and socialism with weapons in hand. The fact that the NKVD bodies (particularly during the time of N.I. Yezhov) were basically engaged not in a true class struggle but rather in a monstrous and extensive simulation of it was disclosed during the mass rehabilitations of the victims of the Stalinist repressions in the middle 1950s and later.

In speaking about the sham execution of the "laws of class struggle," one cannot, of course, forget that internal party political scores were settled under the guise of "class struggle," and so forth. From the composition of the GULAG prisoners, it can be concluded that there was the extensive practice of making preplanned arrests of certain categories of individuals for whom it was not desirable to have them at liberty in the "state's interests," although from the legal viewpoint they were completely innocent. For example, in the second half of the 1930s, among the imprisoned specialists there were rather many financial workers (bookkeepers and so forth). Here there was a desire of the state under the guise of "enemies of the people" to put them behind bars in the aim of more securely protecting the financial secrets (the loss of the right to correspond was caused by the same reason). This is just one of the many examples of the cruel practice of seeking retribution against innocent persons in "state interests."

During the 1920s and up to the beginning of the 1950s, the repressive policy was never halted, but in different periods it showed a tendency to abate and then burst out (the largest outburst was in 1937-1938). This shows that the then leadership of the party and the state viewed repression as an indispensable condition for the normal functioning and steady strengthening of the regime, as a constantly acting tool for strengthening their own power and, ultimately, as a regular pattern of socialist construction.

However, the leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet state viewed repression, including the extensive organization of the camp system) not only as a method of their own self-preservation but also for preserving and strengthening the positions of their own social base in society in the personage of the working class. From the socioclass positions, GULAG was an offspring of the working class which after the October Revolution became the leading class of society. GULAG was invented precisely to isolate the class alien, socially dangerous, subversive, suspicious and other unreliable elements (actual and imaginary) the actions and thoughts of whom did not contribute to the strengthening of the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Having arisen as an instrument and a place for isolating the counterrevolutionary and criminal elements in the interests of defending and strengthening the "dictatorship of the proletariat," GULAG, due to the principle of "rehabilitation by forced labor" (in this principle, in our opinion, there was more hypocrisy than there was utopia), was rapidly turned into an actually independent sector of the national economy which provided a cheap labor force in the form of the prisoners. Without the designated "sector," the carrying out of numerous tasks of industrialization in the eastern and

northern regions would have become virtually impossible. From this stems one other important reason for the constancy of the repressive policy, namely the interest of the state in an unflagging pace in obtaining cheap manpower and employed by force predominantly under the extreme conditions of the East and North.

During the war, the situation of the GULAG prisoners deteriorated. The dietary standards were significantly reduced and this led immediately to a sharp increase in the death rate. While in 1940, in the GULAG camps, 46,665 prisoners died, in 1942, the figure was 248,877, that is, 5.3-fold more (see Table 3). In January 1942, 1,615 prisoners died in Sevrallag [Northern Urals Camp Administration], including 698 from polyvitaminosis, 359 from diseases of the circulatory organs (a heart attack on the grounds of decompensated myocarditis and so forth), 170 from inflammation of the lungs, 118 from tuberculosis, 81 from illnesses of the digestive organs, 22 from illnesses of the respiratory organs, 13 from pellagra and 154 from other illnesses [ibid.]. The physical state of the prisoners remaining alive also deteriorated (Table 8).

Table 8: Proportional Amount of Labor Groups in Total Number of GULAG Prisoners, % [19]

Labor Groups	Years	
	1940	1942
Fit for heavy labor (GTT)	35.6	19.2
Fit for medium labor (GST)	25.2	17.0
Fit for light labor (GLT)	15.6	38.3
Disabled and weak	23.6	25.5

Out of the total number of prisoners who died in the GULAG camps over the 14 years (from 1934 through 1947), 516,841 persons, or 53.6 percent, died within 3 years (1941-1943), while the remaining 446,925 prisoners (46.4 percent) died over a period of 11 years (1934-1940 and 1944-1947) (see Table 3). By 1944, the dietary standards for the GULAG prisoners had been somewhat increased: by 12 percent for bread, by 24 percent for groats, by 40 percent for meat and fish, by 28 percent for fats and by 22 percent for vegetables. But even after this they remained approximately 30 percent below the prewar dietary standards in terms of caloric content [ibid.]. Nevertheless, during the last years of the war, the death rate began to drop noticeably. In 1944, in the GULAG camps, 60,948 prisoners died and in 1945, the figure was 43,848 (see Table 3). A report from the GULAG Medical Department for 1945 points out: "According to the age feature the highest percentage of mortality occurs in the group from 20 to 40 years, that is, among persons most predisposed for tuberculosis of the lungs, alimentary dystrophy and pellagra. By category the highest death rate occurs in category 4 with 67.4 percent, and the 3d category providing 28.9 percent of the mortality. Thus, virtually all mortality, some 96.3 percent, is due to categories 3 and 4 of physical labor" [ibid.].

During the war with the decline in the dietary standards there was a simultaneous increase in the output norms. A significant rise in the level of labor intensification for the

prisoners can be seen, in particular, from the fact that in 1941, in the GULAG, output per worked man day was 9 rubles 50 kopecks and in 1944, 21 rubles [ibid.].

During the first period of the war, some 27 GULAG camps and 210 colonies with a total number of 750,000 prisoners were evacuated from regions threatened by Nazi occupation. The evacuated prisoners were moved to the already overfilled camps and colonies located in the eastern regions of the nation and this led to terrible overcrowding. In 1942, the average living area per prisoner was less than 1 m² (by the end of the war this had been brought up to 1.8 m²) [ibid.].

The war led to a substantial change in the ratio of males and females among the GULAG prisoners (Tables 9 and 10). By the beginning of the war, men made up 93 percent and women were 7 percent, but by July 1944, the ratio was, respectively, 74 percent and 26 percent. During the war, among the prisoners of the ITL there was an increased number of juveniles under the age of 17: in 1942 there were 3,112 of them; in 1943, 4,147; in 1944, 6,988 and in 1945, 6,433 persons (data for 1 January of each year). By 1 January 1946, the number of juveniles in the GULAG camps dropped to 2,035 persons [ibid.].

Table 9: Sexual Composition of Camp Prisoners of GULAG (as of 1 January of Each Year) [20]

Years	Men		Women	
	Absolute Data	%	Absolute Data	%
1934	480,199	94.1	30,108	5.9
1935	680,503	92.8	44,980	6.2
1936	788,286	93.9	51,120	6.1
1937	770,561	93.9	50,320	6.1
1938	927,618	93.1	68,749	6.9
1939	1,207,209	91.6	109,986	8.4
1940	1,235,510	91.9	108,898	8.1
1941	1,352,542	92.4	110,835	7.6
1942	1,231,696	90.8	124,155	9.2
1943	828,719	86.9	125,184	13.1
1944	525,368	81.2	121,981	18.8
1945	534,187	76.0	168,634	24.0
1946	501,772	85.5	85,198	14.5
1947	667,367	84.0	127,224	16.0
1948	888,225	81.0	208,324	19.0

On 1 January 1941, information was missing on the sexual composition of 37,147 GULAG camp prisoners, on 1 January 1942, the figure was 59,745, on 1 January 1943, 30,071, on 1 January 1944, 16,245, on 1 January 1945, 12,684, on 1 January 1946, 159,901, on 1 January 1947, 14,248 and on 1 January 1948, 11,508.

Table 10: Sexual Composition of Prisoners of GULAG Colonies (as of 1 January of Each Year) [21]

Years	Men		Women	
	Absolute Data	%	Absolute Data	%
1943	337,737	71.9	131,928	28.1
1944	283,306	62.3	171,627	37.7
1945	403,659	62.0	246,996	38.0
1946	343,011	73.0	126,748	27.0

On 1 January 1943, information was lacking on the sexual composition of 30,543 prisoners of the GULAG colonies, on 1 January 1944, the figure was 61,292, on 1 January 1945, 94,516 and on 1 January 1946, 486,465.

During the war, the GULAG eliminated the previously existing practice of allowing the courts to grant release of prisoners on parole on the basis of reducing the time of the served punishment by the workdays on which the prisoners fulfilled or overfulfilled the established production quotas. A procedure for the full serving of the sentence was instituted. It was only for individual prisoners who were outstanding production workers and over a long period of serving in places of incarceration set high production indicators that the Special Conference of the NKVD sometimes applied release on parole or a shortening of the sentence [ibid.].

During the war, in the GULAG the number of persons condemned for counterrevolutionary and other particularly dangerous crimes rose by more than 1.5-fold. From the first day of the war they ceased releasing persons condemned of betraying the motherland, for espionage, terror and sabotage, the Trotskyites and rightists; for banditry and other particularly severe state crimes. The total number of persons held from release up to 1 December 1944 was around 26,000 persons. Moreover, around 60,000 persons who had served their time were forced to remain at the camps under "voluntary hire" [ibid.].

One of the reports from the GULAG leadership (1944) stated: "Particular attention is being given to the question of the strict isolating of persons condemned for counterrevolutionary and other particularly dangerous crimes. For these purposes the USSR NKVD is concentrating the most dangerous state criminals condemned for participation in the rightist-Trotskyite counterrevolutionary organizations, for betrayal of the motherland, for espionage, sabotage, terror, the leaders of counterrevolutionary organizations and anti-Soviet political parties, in special prisons as well as in corrective labor camps located in the Far North and Far East (the area of the Kolyma River and the Arctic), where stronger security and harsher conditions have been established combined with heavy physical work in mining coal, oil, iron ore and lumbering" [ibid.]. The numerous requests of the political prisoners to be sent to the front, with rare exception, were not granted.

In 1942-1944, the USSR NKVD conducted several mobilizations of Soviet citizens (Germans, Finns, Romanians, Hungarians and Italians) into the so-called worker colonies organized in accord with the Decree of the State Defense Committee No 1123ss of 10 January 1942. As a total over 400,000 persons were mobilized into these colonies and this number also included around 20,000 representatives of other nationalities (Chinese, Koreans, Bulgarians, Greeks, Kalmyks and Crimean Tatars). Some 220,000 of the persons mobilized into the work colonies were employed in construction and at the NKVD camps and 180,000 at projects of other people's commissariats. These contingents were located within the GULAG system at separate camp areas fenced off with barbed wire and provided with guards [ibid.].

In 1943, state convicts appeared in the USSR. In accord with the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 22 April 1943 "On Measures for Punishing Traitors of the Motherland and Betrayers and Introducing for These Persons Penal Servitude as a Measure of Punishment" the USSR NKVD organized forced labor departments in the Vorkuta and Northeastern camps with the establishing of special conditions which met the demands of the Ukase for the strictest isolating of the persons condemned to forced labor: an extended workday was introduced with the use of the state convicts in hard underground jobs in the coal mines and in mining of gold and tin. By July 1944, the ITL held 5,200 state convicts (by September 1947, their numbers had risen to 6,021 persons) [ibid.].

During the first 3 years of the war, in the GULAG camps and colonies, criminal proceedings were instituted against 148,296 persons (in the second half of 1941, 26,924 persons; in 1942, 57,040; in 1943, 47,244 and in January-May 1944, 17,088), including 118,615 prisoners, 8,543 persons mobilized into the work colonies and 21,538 free workers [persons voluntarily remaining after their sentence]. Some 10,858 persons were sentenced to the supreme sentence (10,087 prisoners, 526 persons mobilized into the work colonies and 245 free workers) [ibid.]. The death sentence was handed down primarily with charges of belonging to the camp underground organizations and groups. One of the GULAG reports stated: "In 1941-1944, some 603 rebel organizations and groups were discovered and liquidated in the camps and colonies and 4,640 persons were active participants in them" [ibid.]. In the given instance, it is not to be excluded that the NKVD bodies in their ordinary sham style "discovered" and "disarmed" a certain number

of rebel organizations and groups which actually were not such, although the fact of the existence of a whole series of underground camp organizations (the Iron Guard and the Russian Society for Vengeance Against the Bolsheviks and others) is certainly beyond doubt.

In accord with the Ukases of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 10 July and 24 November 1941 on the early release of certain categories of prisoners condemned for absences, domestic and insignificant official and economic crimes, with the remanding of induction-age persons to the Red Army, the GULAG released some 420,000 prisoners. According to special rulings of the GKO [State Defense Committee] in 1942-1943, the GULAG provided an early release of 157,000 persons with the transfer of them to the ranks of the Red Army. As a total from the start of the war until June 1944, 975,000 GULAG prisoners were turned over to man the Red Army (including those released upon serving their sentence). For combat feats carried out on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, the former GULAG prisoners Breusov, Yefimov, Ostavnov, Serzhantov and certain others were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union [ibid.].

In addition, in 1941-1942, some 43,000 Polish citizens and around 10,000 Czechoslovak citizens were released from the GULAG camps and a majority of these persons was sent to form their own national troop units. The question arises of how it could happen that in the statistics for the nationality of the GULAG camp prisoners (see Tables 5, 11) for 1940-1943, the number of Poles was significantly less than had been released from the GULAG camps in 1941-1942? In our opinion, a majority of the Poles deported in 1940-1941 from the Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia and Latvia and who were sent to the GULAG camps was included in the "other" (this did include all Czechoslovaks), while the line "Poles" in the camp statistics gave basically the "eastern" Poles, that is, citizens of the USSR within the frontiers prior to 17 September 1939 and, possibly, a small portion of the "western" Poles. As of 1 January of each year, the GULAG camps in 1940 had 67,455 "others"; in 1941, 148,460; in 1942, 136,898; and in 1943, 79,208 (see Tables 5, 11). Such flights and declines in the number of "others" can be explained only by the fact that in 1940 and the first half of 1941, the GULAG camps received tens of thousands of Poles from the western oblasts while in the second half of 1941-1942, a majority of them was released. We do not find any other explanation for such an abrupt change in the number of "others" in the GULAG camps in 1940-1943 and for the discrepancies in the number of Poles.

Table 11: Nationality of Camp Prisoners of GULAG in 1942-1947 (as of 1 January of Each Year) [22]

Nationality	Years					
	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947
Russians	833,814	600,146	403,851	441,723	303,132	412,509
Ukrainians	180,148	114,467	73,832	85,584	107,550	180,294
Belorussians	45,320	25,461	15,264	15,479	24,249	32,242
Georgians	11,171	6,960	5,517	5,446	4,544	4,609
Armenians	10,307	9,300	6,835	6,903	5,477	5,728

Table 11: Nationality of Camp Prisoners of GULAG in 1942-1947 (as of 1 January of Each Year) [22] (Continued)

Nationality	Years					
	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947
Azeris	8,170	4,584	2,924	4,338	3,163	1,495
Kazakhs	19,703	14,888	11,453	12,321	7,822	8,115
Turkmen	8,548	6,078	3,113	2,681	2,007	2,397
Uzbeks	26,978	20,129	8,380	8,426	5,570	4,777
Tajiks	4,896	3,841	2,194	1,872	1,335	1,460
Kirghiz	3,537	2,706	1,437	1,142	1,034	894
Tatars	29,116	17,915	11,933	14,568	9,049	11,045
Bashkirs	4,669	2,414	1,406	1,579	905	1,093
Jews	23,164	20,230	15,317	14,433	10,839	9,530
Germans	19,258	18,486	19,773	22,478	18,155	18,738
Poles	14,982	11,339	8,765	8,306	13,356	16,137
Finns and Karelians	3,547	2,781	2,220	1,929	1,758	2,245
Latvians	7,204	5,008	3,856	3,444	12,302	11,266
Lithuanians	3,074	3,125	2,048	1,805	11,361	15,328
Estonians	6,581	4,556	2,933	2,880	9,017	10,241
Romanians	1,550	1,040	857	815	840	978
Iranians	1,825	1,176	772	678	501	558
Afghans	256	170	89	65	59	48
Mongols	64	37	22	49	20	49
Chinese	5,182	3,848	2,792	2,879	2,614	1,888
Japanese	133	119	116	23	578	660
Koreans	2,403	1,806	1,257	1,397	909	959
Greeks	2,610	1,859	1,344	1,382	1,240	1,247
Turks	488	297	226	281	264	186
Other	136,898	79,208	53,068	50,599	41,247	29,725
TOTAL	1,415,596	983,974	663,594	715,505	600,897	786,441

On 1 January 1946, information was lacking on the nationality of 145,974 GULAG camp prisoners and on 1 January 1947, information on 22,398 prisoners.

Over the first 3 years of the war, more than 2 million GULAG prisoners worked at construction projects under the NKVD, including 448,000 persons in railroad construction, 310,000 in industrial construction, 320,000 in the forestry industry camps, 171,000 in mining and metallurgy, and 268,000 in airfield and highway construction. During the first period of the war, the GULAG turned over 200,000 prisoners for the building of defense perimeters [ibid.].

In addition, in mid-1944, some 225,000 GULAG prisoners were employed at the enterprises and construction projects of other people's commissariats, including 39,000 in the industry of armament and ammunition, 40,000 in ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, 20,000 in the aviation and tank industry, 15,000 in the coal and petroleum industry, 10,000 at power plants and in the electric industry, 10,000 in the lumbering industry and so forth. According to types of jobs, these prisoners were employed as follows: 34 percent in construction work, 25 percent directly in production (in shops, predominantly in subsidiary jobs), 11 percent in ore

mining and 30 percent in other (lumbering, loading work). For example, in June 1944, the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combines employed 4,300 GULAG prisoners, the Dzhezkazgan Copper Smelting Combine employed 3,000, 2,000 were employed in the building of the Ufa Oil Refinery and an equal number at the Plant imeni S.M. Kirov under the People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry. From the start of the war until the end of 1944, the USSR NKVD transferred around 3 billion rubles to state income and this money had been received from the other people's commissariats for the manpower provided to them [ibid.].

The GULAG reports on the mood of the prisoners stated that only an insignificant portion of them was hoping for release by the Nazis. Patriotic attitudes prevailed among a majority. Even under the terrible conditions of GULAG life, concern for the fate of the motherland did not abandon the people. Deprived of the opportunity to defend it with weapons in hand, they endeavored to make their worthy

contribution to victory over the Nazi aggressor, in increasing, as much as was within their power, labor productivity and the output of products, materials and raw materials. In 1944, some 95 percent of the working GULAG prisoners participated in the labor competition, and the number of persons refusing to work in comparison with 1940 declined by 5-fold and was just 0.25 percent of the total number of prisoners capable of working [ibid.].

From the start of the war until the end of 1944, the GULAG prisoners produced 70.7 million units of ammunition (including 25.5 million mines of the M-82 and M-120 class, 35.8 million hand grenades and primers, 9.2 million anti-personnel mines, 100,000 bombs and so forth), 20.7 million sets of special packing, 1,400 KIP (combined nutrition sources for rations) sets, 500,000 reels for field telephone cable, 30,000 boat sleds, 70,000 mortar bomb carriers, 1.7 million faceplates for gas masks, 67 m of textiles (from which 22 million units of uniforms were made), 7 million m³ of wood and many other products, materials and raw materials [ibid.].

[To be continued.]

Footnotes

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New Revolution—Old Experience

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[Text] As the processes brought about by perestroika have developed, we are witnessing the unevenness of its consequences for the fate of the nation.

The word crisis has become a typical assessment of our current state and for the immediate future there is the word catastrophe. All of this confronts the social scientists with a number of serious theoretical methodological questions as a correct solution to these will largely determine not only the possibility of correcting the course being carried out and halting the crisis phenomena but also the possibility in the future of avoiding similar problems. Among these I would like to point to the following: How can the fact be explained that the attempt which is being made for more than the first time in our nation to realize the attractive prospect of a radical restructuring of society in accord with the values and principles approved by a large portion of the politically and socially active population has led to results which are far and away from the planned? Why have the attempts to instill forms for the organization of society, the economy and social life, in having proved effective and become widespread in the democratic nations, not achieved the goal and give rise to serious dysfunctions in Soviet society? How can we explain the striking similarity in a number of political and social processes in perestroika with those which occurred in the nation 73 years ago? Why do we feel constantly that the rapidly developing events are occurring according to some long known already played out scenario

and only the historical entourage, the setting and the names of the actors are changed in the play?

The given article is an attempt to answer these questions from sociological positions, using an explanatory scheme worked out by the author by the beginning of 1987. On the basis of this a rather pessimistic forecast was made for the possible development of events in the near future. A portion of the predictions has already come true in one form or another. Among them is the weakening of state power, outbursts of nationalism, the growth of separatism, extremism, violence and crime, an increased shortage in vital necessities, the breakdown of the Union Federation. The other forecasts, and in particular mass persecutions of various social and nationality groups as enemies of the people, the establishing of a harsh regime of personal power, civil war, thank God, have not come about, although the threat of their realization has not disappeared even now.

The core of the explanatory scheme was the ideas of the Western school of social systems as well as the sociology of organizations, and a number of psychological and cultural concepts interpreted in a definite manner by the author.

One of its most important provisions is that an essential condition for the normal development and effective functioning of society in any phase of its development is to ensure the integrity, unity and coordinated actions of its components and this ultimately causes the ability of society to survive, to set and achieve goals as well as the capacity to respond flexibly to internal and external changes.

The unity and coordination of actions in a society are determined by a specific, dynamic subsystem which can be designated the social organization of society (SOS). The latter provides the required level of control, the limitation and coordination of the different-directed activities of the elements comprising society. The SOS performs a particular role in society, being a fundamentally indispensable element and "carcass" ensuring the integrity and largely setting the system properties of the social organism. A weakening of its effectiveness actually leads to the breakdown of society.

Another provision of the scheme is the fact that the form of the SOS depends largely upon the diversity and effectiveness of the means of social control and regulation of conduct elaborated by society in the process of its historical development. These means are diverse. While outright violence and coercion operate as the most primitive regulators, the most efficient and refined ones include such sociocultural formations as traditions, morality, law, religion, ideology, economic regulation and these carry out this function directly. In keeping with the natural development of society there is the gradual creation, accumulation and improving of the means which support the functions of the SOS and also the establishing of the social institutions and bodies of power which ensure their employment.

For the early stages in the development of a society, with their characteristic deficit and low effectiveness of the means and mechanisms of social regulation, with its weak differentiation and specialization in the social institutions supporting them, characteristic are rather harsh forms of the

SOS which widely employ direct violence. As the forms and images of culture are worked out, as effective and specialized social institutions are created, the necessary level of orderliness to an ever-greater degree is achieved by socio-cultural means of control. The presence in the culture of the given society of the corresponding means and mechanisms of social regulation and social control operates as an important limiter on the use of the various forms of organizing society. These can be elaborated in the course of the previous development of the society or introduced into the given culture, but they should be profoundly assimilated and institutionalized. A violation of the given provision leads directly to a weakening of state power, to the distorting and destruction of the social organism and excludes the normal conditions of its functioning and development.

One other provision of the scheme is the fact that an essential condition for the normal functioning and development of a society is the adequacy of the forms and means of the SOS to the level and type of sociocultural development of the individual and which has been historically formed and is predominant in the society. As the measure of its development it is possible to use the ability for individual self-organization, self-regulation and self-limitation, and for positing and realizing goals within such limitations. This presupposes, on the one hand, the presence of a sufficiently developed set of images and forms of culture of a certain type (standards, values, images of interaction), and on the other, their profound assimilation and interiorization by the individual. The process of the development of the individual within such an approach can be represented as the gradual and tortuous transition from the external type of individual to the internal one.

The former is an externally regulated and motivated type of personality which is found in the early stages of social development. This can be easily described by the behaviorist models of regulating behavior of the "stimulus—response" type. The other type is the self-regulated, where there is a predominance of the sociocultural regulators of behavior and which have been previously interiorized by the individual and have become an inseparable part of him. The crucial distinction for us between the agent of the exterior type of conduct and the interior one is the fact that for the former the chief criterion in choosing a form of conduct is the orientation to the demand of "significant others" (members of the family or community, elders, leaders) there is a characteristic putting off onto them of responsibility for one's behavior and a complete identification of oneself with the social organism. Predominant for the second type is an orientation to correlating one's behavior with an impersonal system of assimilated values, standards, principles and images. Characteristic of him is a heightened feeling of personal responsibility, and the autonomy of the individual in relation to the community. All of this presupposes a substantial difference in the forms of the SOS depending upon the regulated type of personality. It is no accident that the dominant form of organizing society in the early stages of its development are harsh authoritarian regimes constructed on a principle of unlimited personal power, based on rigid hierarchy and the use of the means of total control of behavior and direct violence.

As the internal type of personality develops, milder forms arise in organization and control and these provide the autonomy of the individual. Hence the conclusion that the attempt to create and legalize in a society forms of the SOS which are not adequate to the real type and level of development of the individual leads to a decline in effectiveness, to a weakening of social control, to the disintegration of society, to the breakdown and degradation of the personality and ultimately to the throwing back of society to the earlier stages of development.

The next idea can be reduced to the assertion that society, as a system developing in stages and a complex social organism, cannot be without severe consequences for itself when radically restructured in accord with one or another social plan. Here it is unimportant as to what goal orientation is placed at its base. As practice shows, such plans (from the unrealized "city of the sun" of T. Campanella to the realized Jesuit state in Latin America) are based ultimately on two very dubious assumptions:

1. Society and man can be altered relatively easily and radically in accord with one or another social ideal, if the appropriate conditions are provided.
2. The reformers have a good understanding of such an ideal and the conditions for realizing it.

Characteristically, in defining the very principles and ideals the reformers could rely on two seemingly contradictory but in fact similar methodologies: a) the openly voluntaristic which assumes that the future in no way is tied to the past and is completely in the hands of the reformers; b) the covertly voluntaristic, the teleological proceeding from the view that the world is developing according to laws known to the reformer. Such concepts can arise on a religious, ideological or scientific basis. The logic of their constructing assumes the possibility of a radical reworking of society by replacing the old forms of organization with new or "progressive" ones and replacing "false values" with "true ones" and one type of personality by another. In practice, the realization of ideal plans leads to the creation of a shortage of means of regulation, to an value and social-normative vacuum and to the destruction of culture and the social organism. In order to better understand the capabilities of our scheme, let us turn to the events of February 1917 and the further history of the nation.

Let us endeavor to analyze what Russia was on the eve of these events. The author sides with the view of those specialists who feel that this was a developed feudal-statist society with significant overlays of bourgeois relations. In agriculture and industry, these had intertwined with the feudal forms of organizing production, with protectionism, the active intervention of the state into the affairs of the industrialists, with serious vestiges of feudal land tenure and elements of a communal psychology. The SOS was a product of the protracted and torturous historical process and a compromise between the traditional and still forming relations. It was a diverse system which included both the means of direct coercion as well as milder (sociocultural)

forms of regulating conduct. Among the latter were ideology, religion, morality, law, traditions and economic relations. The Empire possessed a powerful bureaucratic structure based upon a well-schooled staff of bureaucrats.

Being a limited monarchy which corresponded to its feudal base, it, beginning in 1961, along with the 4 feudal means also employed the means of regulation which would appeal to bourgeois values. In the society a system of formal law and jurisprudence was created and in accord with this the army and the local self-governing bodies were formed. After 1905, there were elective bodies of popular representation and a limited multiparty system.

Thus, the SOS was adequate to the economic and sociocultural state of society with all its contradictoriness.

We would also point out the particular feature characteristic for the sphere of social awareness in Russia and commented on by historians, beginning with V.O. Klyuchevskiy. Since the times of Peter I, Russian social thought has been constantly oriented at cultural, ideological and political images developed by Western Europe. Virtually all the significant movements of the official, liberal or revolutionary stripe either borrowed Western ideas or developed their own concepts in polemics with them.

Another phenomenon of social awareness was the idea of radical sociopolitical "jumps" which were viewed as a means for accelerating the development of the nation. This also went back to the times of Peter I.

The embodiment of these ideas in life accelerated the crisis caused by Russia's involvement in World War I. The February Revolution was an attempt to overcome this and quickly resolve the real (and partially imaginary) problems with the aid of an immediate democratization of the institutions of power and the reworking of the SOS in the Western manner.

Although the February events did not touch upon such bases of the regulation of Russian society as religion or morality, they were reflected importantly in the power structures and involved many of its institutions. The proposed method of organizing society included a broad multiparty system, the introduction of civil liberties and the creation of the principles of republic administration. The proposed changes corresponded little to the dominant external semicommunal type of personality. Combined with the active eroding of traditional values, this brought about a weakness in the mechanism of the SOS being formed and contributed to the activating of rightist and leftist extremist groups.

The history of the 20th Century knows numerous examples when various countries, in being in the prebourgeois stage of development, adopted democratic constitutions following the model of the United States or the Western European countries, however the result of such innovations almost everywhere has been tragic. An example would be the numerous Latin American states and the African and Asian countries. Here the inadequacy of democratic forms of administering national culture was compensated for by mafioso or military parallel structures of power based upon

outright violence. For the declared democracy quickly degenerated into its opposite, harsh military dictatorship.

The same fate awaited Russia. The weakness of the Provisional Government and the political institutions established by it was obvious from the very start and brought to life parallel structures of power in the form of the soviets, on the one hand, and the organizations fighting for the restoration of the monarchy in its orthodox forms, on the other. Both forces represented a real threat to the government. The situation was complicated by the fact that the weak government, in employing democratic means, was in principle incapable of a quick and radical solution to the social and economic problems which had led to the downfall of the autocracy. With the weakening of power there was a tendency for increased separatism, extremism, destructive conduct and crime. This strengthened the position of the numerous critics of the government to the right and to the left and which unmasked its ineffectiveness. An orientation to believe in democratic principles and a fear of harsh measures under the conditions of the absence of responsibility and political culture among a majority of the population made the Provisional Government incapable of showing force and placing the opposition within the confines of legality. The political positioning of the forces brought to power one of the most radical and active factions of the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Workers Party], the Leninist one and this set the goal of carrying out in Russia and throughout the world the idea of a fundamental restructuring of society in accord with the Marxist ideal understood in a particular manner.

We will not take it upon ourselves to analyze which of the measures carried out by the Soviet government stemmed from the Bolshevik Program and which were the product of the extraordinary circumstances and revolutionary creativity of the masses. Rather, it is important to analyze which of these reflected in practice the political essence of this period and to what consequences they led.

The purpose of the action of the new power during the years of the Revolution and Civil War consisted in breaking up the established means of the SOS. During the first 3 years of revolution, they completely destroyed all the bodies of the state and the institutions of power which had come into being over many generations, the ideology of autocracy and religion was discredited, the church was restricted in its rights, the young bourgeois law was eliminated, morality, traditions and values were weakened, the professional bureaucrats and administrators were removed from power; the bodies of law and order and the professional army were disbanded; the institution of property was distorted, and the system of free trade and the financial system were destroyed. As a result of all of this, there was the disappearance or weakening of all inherited means of social regulation in society. Outright violence became the only means for maintaining the integrity of society.

From this moment the question of further development was predetermined. Regardless of what political force came to power in the course of the Civil War it could not now be based upon traditional forms of regulation. The SOS from now on could be based solely on violence. The result of this

was the collapse of the imperial state and this was expressed in the separatism of a number of provinces and in a weakening of central power. No force was unable to effectively control from the center the behavior of the "liberated" citizens of the noncapital provinces and districts. Documents, artistic literature and memoirs describing the times of the Civil War show that at that time a particular local-regional form of the SOS came into existence and this was utilized by each army, detachment and by the local authorities. This was revolutionary democracy. In being based upon the most flagrant types of violence, this "democracy" was an embodiment of the virtually unlimited tyranny of the leaders who had the support of a majority in any group of the armed people. They became the unchallenged masters of their regions and were virtually out of control by the center. The given form of rule by the people provided the right of the leader of a democratic majority to employ, acting on their behalf, any type of violence from expropriation to the physical elimination of a person or the opposition minority.

In the absence of a unified and generally recognized morality, traditions, a legal base, a unified and uniformly interpreted ideology and powerful central authority, the leaders were turned into judges in assessing the political reliability of opponents, enemies or previous allies and even simple philistines who handed down decisions on the fate of people based on intuition and "class feeling." The leader was the last instance who interpreted the slogans and goals of the party on behalf of which he acted. Precisely he was interpreter of the revolutionary (or counterrevolutionary) ideals, and assessed the degree of following them. In turn, the rule of such leaders was limited by the will of the majority which could instantly overthrow and trample on yesterday's idol. Such democracy did not need separation of power or legal guarantees for the individual. It proceeded from the privacy of class affiliation over law, from the principle of the right of the majority over the minority, and from the "presumption of guilt" for any potential enemy. The principles of military-democratic rule of the people underlay the universal and solely possible mechanism of the SOS under those conditions. The practical consequences of the decrees and orders issued by the government (be it the government of V.I. Lenin or A.V. Kolchak) were minimal. These did not play a serious role in the regulating of social life on the spot. Armed groups operating on behalf of the government and headed by commanders and atamans had the only real power over the enormous territory of the former Russian Empire. The established forms of the SOS were largely analogous to those which predominated in Western Europe during the period of early feudalism when the power of the center was nominal and actual power rested with the leaders of the infinite armed militias which roamed over the European lands and constantly fought one another. These groupings for the population were simultaneously both plunderers and the only agents of power which guaranteed a certain protection and minimum order. The forms of running the economy and distribution were based upon direct noneconomic coercion and a natural economy and this fully corresponded to the established political system

and cultural development of society. Incidentally, in 1920-1921, in the army and the state there was a tendency for a strengthening of central power and the then solely possible administrative-force form. However, the influence of the government on the spot remained very limited.

By 1921, the Civil War had ended on a larger portion of Russia. The victory of the Bolsheviks was beyond doubt. Yet there was the obvious question of the monstrous social and economic results of the revolutionary changes. Russia which yesterday had been part of the European Great Powers was now still an enormous, weakly controlled territory but one which had lost a significant portion of its land with a shattered economy and dying population. The policy of tyranny, plunder and terror carried out primarily by the local authorities continued. Food requisitioning was introduced in the nation. The state was shaken by erupting revolts of the peasants, workers, Red Army men and national minorities dissatisfied with the hunger, the lack of vital necessities, the reign of crime and the political and economic tyranny. The search for a way out led the Bolsheviks to a torturous decision of temporarily abandoning the implementation of the program of radical communist restructuring based on total nationalization of the means of production, the socialization of property, the creation of labor armies and the compulsory redistribution of industrial and agricultural products. It was proposed that they would return, albeit partially, to the developed traditional methods of management which had not yet been forgotten by the population.

The introduction of a permanent tax and the return to the practice of free market trade marked the era of the NEP [New Economic Policy]. The transition to the new forms of organizing the economy demanded a certain liberalizing of the revolutionary dictatorship. On the one hand, this meant the mitigating of the revolutionary legislation and, on the other, the elimination of the tyranny of the "leaders" on the spot. The latter could be done only by strengthening the administrative centralized principle in the VKP(b) [All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)], and by limiting the democratic and separatist trends in the party and the state. The economic and political about-face which occurred after the Tenth Party Congress at first produced brilliant results as the people had not yet forgotten how to work "in the old style." The level of agricultural production increased by several-fold and the output of industrial goods rose. However, by 1925, the increase in the production of market grain declined and in 1927, halted. The situation was even more complex with industrial development. Why had this happened? Primarily because individual entrepreneurship could not successfully develop outside elementary legal guarantees since the system of bourgeois law and the legal awareness of the citizens had been destroyed. The activities of the NEPmen in the city were accompanied by partial expropriations, by a constant increase in taxes and political discrediting. In the countryside, regardless of the instructions from the center, "revolutionary pressure" was applied to the resourceful peasants. Both the NEPmen and the "kulaks" were limited in their political rights. Incidentally, it could not have been otherwise. In all corners of the land there were numerous heroes of the Civil War who had

gained authority among the public, local leaders who advocated egalitarian justice, the cult of force and the preaching of the quick attainment of the social ideal. Inherent to them was a view of a merciless struggle against any manifestations of the old world. The NEP was viewed by them as betrayal of the revolution's ideals. Usually being members of the VKP(b) and formally obeying the central party leadership, they gave their own interpretation to government decisions and acted as a potential and real opposition to the new policy. The struggle against the opposition under the guise of combating the NEP strengthened the centralized principle in the party and state. This objectively underlay the unceasing campaigns to combat opposition trends in the party. Opposition to the NEP grew stronger as the limited nature of its abilities became apparent. The economic failings increased the "revolutionary" rejection of the set course. Pressure from below forced the party leaders to seek out alternative paths of development for the state. But at that time it was impossible to even conceive of the further development of the state with any model of the economy without firm political power at the center and without a uniform recognized ideology, morality and law as factors which shape a single community.

Approximately from 1929, there began a new stage related to the strengthening of state power in our society. This was characterized by the establishing of the monopolistic, uncontrolled and extremely harsh rule of a single individual. The repressive bodies which had been established at the end of the Civil War and having been strengthened during the years of the NEP as well as the hierarchical structure of the party and state ensured the predominance of the centralized principle. But the party itself was also to change. It was turned from a group of associates into a tool of centralized leadership. The restructuring in the party and the state necessitated the elimination (or at best neutralization) of a significant portion of its members who had been raised up on the ideas of revolutionary democracy and had authority in the party. This meant first of all the prominent leaders of October and the Civil War. The mechanism for applying mass repression had been worked out during the first years of Soviet power and had been repeatedly employed also up to the lamentably famous second half of the 1930s. However, now the focus of the terror was directed against the party members themselves. As a result, the status of the party leader in fact was identified with the status of the unattainable, god-given monarch.

Since the economic party of the program of Stalinism is well known, we will merely point out the rise of powerful centralized structures of authority, the strengthening of administrative principles and the creation of a specific model of communal-collective property. A system was introduced for indenturing the worker in industry to the enterprise and the peasant to the kolkhoz, combined with their actual legal absence of rights and assignment to a certain place of residence. The will of the "monarch" acted as the main regulator of social life. The establishing of a uniform ideology, a uniform system of values and standards and a uniform morality was ensured by strict centralization in the party and by a powerful bureaucratic machine and

police apparatus. A particular type of bureaucrat was created inculcated in a spirit of the unswerving following of orders from above and in a spirit of personal loyalty to the sovereign. The established type of SOS in many of its traits reproduced the forms of the absolutist monarchical feudal state. It was precisely at that time that the roots were put down for the feudal-serf psychology which still survives in the souls of the Soviet people at present. The formation of such a social type, along with the strengthening of the feudal-bureaucratic apparatus of the state functionaries, was the main achievement of Stalinism and a condition for the transition of society to a new stage.

The establishing of the given type of SOS was marked by the strengthening of the state and by the final destruction of the democratic victories of the revolution as well as by greater social stratification. In the West, this was received with approbation by that portion of the emigres who not without grounds saw in this a restoration of the monarchy in new socialist clothing. During the period of the monstrous repressions the authority of the state became irrefutable for the entire population. The threat to the existence of the community was eliminated. The state-set standards, values and morality were introduced by force and assimilated well by the public. Marxist-Leninist teachings gained a standard interpretation and at the same time played the role of ideology and a religion. In the city and countryside, powerful forms of communal regulation and social control of behavior came into being, where each person was under the total control of the social organizations and neighbors. All of this created prerequisites for moving on to the next stage in the development of Soviet society.

It has already been said that during the period of Stalinism, there developed a smoothly-running machine of the bureaucracy and a large staff of administrators with a definite level of administrative skills. The upper echelon of the apparatus began to realistically assess its importance as an elite and make claim to broadening its privileges. However, this was obscured by the prospect of unpredictable repression by the General Secretary. It was precisely the given group established as an instrument of Stalin's policy which more often than any others became the victim of his tyranny. It was primarily this group which was above all interested in establishing guarantees for security and a strengthening of their place in the state. An equally important condition for the transition to the new era was the assimilation by the public of the "spiritual baggage" (the system of sociocultural values, standards and norms) developed during this period. It was no longer necessary to resort to total violence for maintaining the required level of integration of the community or involving the citizens in effective activities.

The following, post-Stalinist stage in the development of the SOS can conditionally be defined as a period of a certain limiting of the power of the "absolute monarch" and a liberalizing of the forms of administration. Its essence is linked to a reduced role for violence as a means of regulating behavior and a process of allocating power from one ruler to several. The period which commenced after the death of Stalin has become widely known under the name of the

"thaw" and is ordinarily associated with the name of N.S. Khrushchev. In translating the content of the "thaw" into the language of historical analogies, we can rightly view it as a certain restriction on the role of absolutism and a stronger role for the feudal-bureaucratic elite in managing the state. Such changes could not help but touch the political and economic life of the broadest strata of the population. Among the best known actions were the mass rehabilitation of the repressed persons, the condemnation of Stalinist repressions, and a weakening of the serf form of dependence in the countryside and city. The Khrushchev reforms envisaged greater collegiality in decision-taking, accountability by the repressive apparatus of the party and executive power and the introduction of elementary legal regulation in the social organization. At the same time, the reforms did not touch the basic principles of the SOS which had become established during the period of Stalinism.

Virtually all the changes of those times were adequate to the level of social awareness and were carried out under a slogan of eliminating the distortions and crimes of Stalin with a rather loyal assessment of the system built by him. Neither the ruling group nor a majority of the population could conceive of another system. In the area of the reforms which objectively strengthened the situation of the administrative-bureaucratic stratum, Khrushchev relied primarily on the support of that portion of the elite which had not besmirched itself with serious crimes. At the same time, to the degree that the changes were carried out under a banner of loyalty to Leninism, to a definite degree they supported the ideas of a return to revolutionary egalitarianism and romanticism. A policy was established of decentralizing economic management, and an attempt was made to introduce a territorial-pluralistic model of management which largely copied the bodies of economic management from the first years of Soviet power. A policy was also carried out of reducing the gap in the standard of living between the lowly- and highly-paid workers. The system was broadened of distributing material goods through the public consumption funds. Finally, the question was raised of limiting the term of office of the elective party and state officials. This caused concern and dissatisfaction among the bureaucratic elite which had just escaped from the threat of Stalinist tyranny. The desire to restore revolutionary democracy under such conditions was doomed. In 1964, the party upper clique eliminated N.S. Khrushchev from power precisely for this desire, using numerous errors as a pretext, and this was done with the moral support of a significant portion of the population which saw in Khrushchev's anti-Stalinism an encroachment on the victories of socialism.

The next stage in the development of the SOS coincided with the almost 20-year rule of L.I. Brezhnev. This was characterized, on the one hand, by the establishment and final affirmation of the collegial power of a "feudal-administrative" elite and, on the other, by the growing role of the nonadministrative value-based regulation of behavior involving the forming of a parallel "shadow" economy. The attempt at economic reform in 1965 was marked by a desire to combine the administrative and value-based methods of regulation. Its important result was a substantial rise in the role of money in society as a means of regulating the

behavior of the population. The reform helped to strengthen the economic and social stratification of society which had come into being under Stalin, it intensified the sphere of consumption and made an orientation to achieving material prosperity as one of the real values of the Soviet people. However, an orientation toward earnings did not create the possibility of reconciling this with legal entrepreneurial activity. With a rather low level of satisfying consumer demand and the presence of a constant shortage of goods, the result of such an orientation was the applying of the forces of a portion of the population in various spheres of underground business. In the "shadow" economy the lion's share was taken up by middleman speculative operations (a completely normal phenomenon in the formation of precapitalist relations in all the European countries). Business began to develop in providing various services which supplemented the far-from-perfect state services. Other types of economic activity were in the embryonic state, for example, underground production. In having available the means and claiming a special role a portion of the party-official bureaucracy was also the victim of the economy of scarcity, it encouraged the businessmen acting as the customer for a broad range of goods and services lacking in ordinary Soviet reality. Objectively, it encouraged the growth of mafioso-type social groups. A specific feature of the Brezhnev "stagnation" period was that in declaring loyalty to revolutionary ideas and the principles of "developed socialism" and at the same time being perfectly aware of the discrepancy of these principles to existing social reality, Brezhnev and his "team" at a certain time began more and more often to close their eyes to both the increasing portion of persons engaged in a formally prohibited latent economy and to the unofficial income received by them. In actuality, the struggle was ceased against a rise in social and property inequality. The process of forming a precapitalist market and value-based forms of regulating behavior went on latently within the framework of the feudal structures. The figure of the rich man was again dangled as an example for imitation. In aiming at high standards of consumption (in following the Western model), a portion of the officialdom began to collaborate with the underground businessmen who could provide the money and goods for attaining such standards in exchange for protection. But the weak latent cost-based economy could be realized only with support from the feudal structures of power. The given relations and their carriers were still quite far from capitalist ones and in essence represented a certain model of the early forms of an "Asian market," but the described stage also had analogies in the history of all the Western European countries, when capitalist relations were being born there.

The transformation of the structures of power and the change in the orientation of a portion of the population have opened up prospects for the development of value-based market relations in the economy and social life. In our view, these trends, as a whole have been positive ones making it possible in the future to count upon the establishing of a market mechanism of the Western type in our nation. Over the 70 years of Soviet power, our society has been able to follow a path from forms of the SOS similar to the "early

feudal" to forms of the SOS similar to forms of regulation characteristic for late feudal relations with elements of precapitalist relations.

The change in the system of values and the model of conduct reflecting these trends has gone on slowly and has not involved the entire population of the nation. At the same time, a heterogeneous opposition has formed to the course being carried out. While the liberal intelligentsia, the economists and the businessmen involved in the latent market relations have criticized the system from the viewpoint of Western democracy and a market economy, another portion of the population has compared it with the socialist ideal. The processes occurring have often been perceived in a dramatic manner. This has been aided both by the flagrant discrepancy between the postulated ideals and actuality, the demoralization of the corrupt officials as well as an awareness of the striking differences between the level and quality of life in our nation and the developed Western countries.

Perestroika has become precisely an answer to these problems and it was initially conceived of by the nation's leadership as a series of rather limited and cautious reforms from above aimed at modernizing the SOS and evening out social tensions. It has acquired allies in the form of both groups of critics of the current system. The latter have viewed the current state of society as a product of lamentable errors by the current and previous leaders of the nation and have demanded its radical reworking in accord with their notions about the social ideal. Both groups of critics have viewed the democratization of the political and economic system of the nation (although they understand this differently) as the means guaranteeing against the perpetuation of new errors. The "Westerner" democrats have come out against totalitarianism, personal captivity, administrative coercion and the absence of democracy in its Western understanding. They have emphasized the inefficiency of a centralized planned economy and social philanthropy. Their ideal is a market society with forms of the SOS following the type of developed democracies. Simultaneously with the "Westerners" "stagnation" has been sharply criticized by a second group of critics of the populist stripe who have as their goal a return to revolutionary democracy. The "revolutionary democrats" see as the basic reason for the negative phenomena in political life the distorting by Stalin of the ideas of socialism, seeing the party apparatus and the bureaucracy as the chief enemy of perestroika. They act under slogans of social justice, the combating of corruption, the equality of incomes and direct democracy. Both groups in drawing closer from the very first day of perestroika have substantially influenced the course being carried out by the leadership and have been strongly reflected, on the one hand, in the law on unearned income, the demand for revolutionary measures to combat bureaucracy, and, on the other, in the law on individual labor activity and cooperatives, and in the orienting of society to establish a state under the law and plans for the rapid formation of market relations. In differing substantially over political goals, these forces are identical in their

radicalism, showing an exceptional unanimity and determination in the desire to completely destroy the command-administrative system, the existing economic mechanism and the institutions of power.

These have been competing with one another in eroding the "false values," standards and traditions which have come into being over the 73 years. It must be pointed out that the activities of the radicals have largely already achieved their goal. There has been substantial and irreversible destruction in the mechanisms of the SOS.

However, such an unnatural bloc is becoming ever-less integrated and the forces participating in political restructuring are confronting one another evermore acutely. The hypothetical victory of each of these lines virtually reproduces in their main configuration the characteristics of the already examined political scenarios of the February and October Revolutions and in realization assumes in one version or another a repetition of the history gone through since 1917. No matter how shameful this might seem but the nation which has still not completely recovered from the consequences of a revolution is again threatened by the spectrum of a new one which offers the temptation of a quick solution to all problems.

It seems that our society in one way or another will travel in a circle until we finally realize that society is not a machine, not a dead structure but rather a living organism which grows and develops according to its own laws independent of the ideals and will of the amateur reformers. We must escape once and for all from the illusion that certain wise men are capable of manipulating laws in sharply accelerating whenever they so desire the pace of social development. As domestic and foreign experience has shown, the attempt to abstract oneself from the logic and pace of historical development, and to force real life into the framework of even the finest ideal which is inadequate to the established culture and development level of the individual leads to a weakening of the mechanisms of social regulation to a destruction of its own integrated social system and in the immediate future forces a repetition of the distance already covered. The pace of any reforming initiatives such as our perestroika should ensure a succession in the development of society and not lead it into the next revolutionary chaos. The immediate task of a sociologist on the sociocultural level is the task of persuading the politicians and a majority of the population that the very idea of a sharp revolutionary jump—so attractive for the ordinary person as a means for quickly resolving important social and economic problems—is hopeless. The embodying of this idea in life is fraught with a national disaster of one or another scale, and it will push society back in comparison with the "pre-jump" point of development. We should instill in society a healthy conservatism and develop in the people an immunity to both revolutionary romanticism and radicalism.

On the political level it is important to create a society under control but one with strong state power capable of checking the process of the nation's slide to disaster and forcing respect for state power and the law.

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How Much Does a Bride Cost?

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[Text] In conducting a survey of students of indigenous nationality in the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan,¹ we asked the question: "Does the Moslem religion require the payment of bride money ['kalym']?" The replies were distributed in the following manner: 30.9 percent of those questioned replied "yes," 23 percent said "no" and 42.4 percent said "I don't know."

Here we encounter a paradox rarely encountered in sociological practice when all of the given replies can be recognized as correct. For explaining this conclusion we must have a small reference to history.

Marriage of the Prophet Moses in the Interpretation of the Prophet Mohammed

In being somewhat schematic, it is possible to establish three historical traditions which have come into being in the "purchase" of a bride. In one instance, after the first married night, in the morning the girl was presented with a gift, a "morning gift" or payment for her virginity. It is easy to understand why this was made on the following morning and after the concluding of the marriage contract (wedding). In the second instance, prior to the marriage the parents (relatives) of the bride are paid monetary compensation for the expenses and effort related to the raising of their daughter. In a third version the groom's side after the marriage and the first wedding night pays both the "morning gift" to the bride, as well as "compensation" to her parents.

The first of the listed traditions or "morning gift" existed among the nomadic Arabs of Arabia. By the moment that Islam arose there, the custom had already become "divorced" from its initial symbolism and the gift to the bride (even if she was not a virgin) represented merely a necessary element of the marriage contract.

The second of the mentioned customs of paying a marriage ransom to the parents of the bride existed also in the pre-Islamic times and in particular among the Turkic peoples.

There is an interesting story of the canonizing of the "morning gift" by Islam. In the Surah 28 of the Koran [2] there is the detailed story of the Prophet Moses (Musa) described in the Old Testament (Genesis, Chapters 2-3). However, from the viewpoint of the studied problem, there is a fundamental discrepancy between the two designated

versions. Let us recall that Moses, after the murder committed by him, fled from the city, he encountered two young girls with a flock and helped them water their sheep. In the biblical version, having taken a positive view of Moses, the father of these girls gives one of them to him to marry. In the interpretation of the Prophet Mohammed (the Koranic version), the father of the girls sells one of his daughters to Moses (Surah 2; Ayat 27).² Here great importance is given to the obligations of the groom in this transaction. In accord with the text of the Pentateuch, God spoke to Moses to order him to lead the Jews out of slavery at a moment when he was tending his livestock. However, according to the text of the Koran, God (Allah) spoke to Moses after he, having paid fully for his wife, had left his father-in-law's house. That is, the Lord had to wait for the freeing of the chosen people until the groom had completely paid the marriage ransom.... And this took several years.... The Koran states: "...Marry such women as seem good to you, two and three and four...and give women their dowries ['veno'] as a free gift" (4; 3). The bride money in the given instance means the wedding gift from the groom, his purchase of her. In Arabic, it is called the "makhr." Since the "makhr" as the development of the ritual of the "morning gift," it naturally became the property of the wife. If one disregards certain exceptions, the "makhr" was not to be returned. In the instance of divorce caused by the husband or his death, the wife takes the "makhr." For it is written in the Koran: "Owe you who believe!...do not prevent them (the wives, F.I.) from taking off that portion of what you have given them unless they are committing an obvious abomination" (4; 23). The individual Islamic religious-legal schools viewed a marriage concluded without the presenting of a "makhr" as invalid.

Proceeding from the given facts, one could recognize as correct the answer of "yes" (30.9 percent) to the question: "Does the Moslem religion require the payment of bride money?" However, Islam did canonize the "makhr" but this ritual (rite) is not fully identical with the bride money. The latter is the marriage payment paid by the groom's side to the parents of the bride and is a preliminary condition for the conclusion of the marriage. The bride money arose in the prehistorical era and in the process of the Islamization of the peoples who observe this rite was subjected to the influence of the Islamic law institution of the "makhr." Thus, the bride money, on the one hand, has as it were the favor of the Islamic Church, but, on the other hand, the "makhr" is the canonical form of the marriage payment. The bride money contains the "makhr," as it consists of two parts: one portion (as a rule, the larger) remains with the parents and is their property and the second representing the "payment for virginity" is the property of the bride (among the Turkmen this is called the "sep"). With her portion of the bride money (with the "sep"), usually in the form of things, the bride travels to her husband's house. The "sep" is her property and in a divorce she has the right to take it. For it was written on the sacred tablets that in the event of a divorce the husband was given the following instructions for the "morning gift" to the wife: "And do not take what you have given them as this is nothing" (2; 229).

For this reason, in strictly speaking, the opinion of the 23.0 percent of the polled students who feel that Islam does not

require the payment of bride money³ can be recognized as valid. The same is true, incidentally, with the answer "I do not know" (42.4 percent), as it is difficult to give a uniform answer to the question of whether Islam requires bride money. If one were to move from the dichotomy to a gentler design of the scale, then probably the most correct would be the answer: "Rather yes than no." Incidentally, the obtained distribution of answers with 30.9 percent for "yes" and 23.0 percent for "no," if this were generalized, could lead precisely to the obtained formulation.

However, a study of the canonical texts and the opinion of the theological legal scholars is not sufficient grounds for a conclusion on whether religiousness has a direct (functional) link with a marriage involving bride money. The latter circumstance was checked out in our research. The share of marriages concluded with the payment of bride money in the studied region was 68.2 percent and the share of marriages performed with the inviting of a mullah was 71 percent. As we can see, the level of "religiousness" of the marriages exceeds the level of the "bride money" by approximately 3 percent. That is, to obtain "blessings from above" is a more frequently encountered motive than is the "receiving of bride money." However, this is only the average. For the individually taken republics, the picture is quite contradictory as in three of them the percentage of religiousness exceeds the percentage of "bride money" (Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) while in two the share of "bride-money" marriages is higher (Kazakhstan, Kirghizia) while in Turkmenia these indicators are equal (see Table 1).

Table 1: Ratio of Share of Religious and Bride Money Marriages

Republics	Percent of Marriages Concluded		Excess of Share of Religious Marriages Over Bride Money Ones
	With Invitation of Mullah	With Payment of Bride Money	
Azerbaijan	61.5	51.8	+9.7
Kazakhstan	32.4	59.2	-26.8
Kirghizia	70.3	79.8	-9.5
Tajikistan	86.5	66.8	+19.7
Turkmenia	80.1	80.0	+0.1
Uzbekistan	84.8	67.3	+17.5
Average for Region	71.0	68.2	+2.8

Analysis shows the absence of a linkage between religiousness and bride money. In this manner one of the hypotheses of our research was not confirmed.

The Woman of the East—Who Is She?

The author of "Third World Theory," M. Qaddafi in his fundamental work has pointed out quite validly: "Woman is a person. A man is also a person. This is an indisputable and undoubted truth. Consequently, man and woman are

equally people" [3, p 120]. The real inequalities between the sexes derive from the imperfection of the world and the chaos in human souls.

Our poll brought out opinions on the reasons for the existence of bride money. As it turned out, the student view established two basic groups of factors: the first (pointed out by 31.1 percent of those questioned) was the "preservation of customs" (a neutral or positive assessment) and the second (15.1 percent) gave "cultural backwardness" (a negative assessment). Such factors as "parental pressure," "selfishness," "conformism" and "considerations of prestige" were pointed out by from 2.6 percent to 5.2 percent of those questioned. Only 1.2 percent of the students pointed to the decline of the social system as a cause of the existence of bride money (here the maximum number was 3.6 percent in Turkmenia and the minimal (0 percent) in Kirghizia). One is struck by the fact that in Uzbekistan the share of persons who did not answer this question was significantly more than in the other republics (almost 50 percent with 32.5 percent for the region as a whole).

While the patriarchal-totalitarian system is the actual reason for the existence of bride money in the region (for more detail on this see [1]) with its attribute being the marriage for money, many (46.2 percent) of those questioned spoke about the inertia of customs. The fact that only 1.2 percent of the respondents indicated the actual reason shows the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda which for decades viewed bride money as a "harmful vestige" which supposedly had no "roots in a socialist society."

Clearly, for a more complete understanding of the phenomenon of bride money ("makhr"), it is essential to describe how this question is dealt with by the religious-legal schools. Certainly precisely these texts reflect the deep veins of the attitude toward women and an understanding of her situation in society.

What Is a Marriage Purchase From the Islamic Legal Viewpoint?

"The dowry is a payment for the right of marital cohabitation with the woman," state the commentaries of Moslem law [4, p 165]. Since in a purchased marriage the cornerstone is ultimately the purchase itself, the passions aroused over it reflect the true picture of the relations between the sexes and the place of woman in society.

Let us examine a fragment of the debate which broke out in the 12th Century and was related to the problem of the return of the bridal payment. In the course of this, the viewpoint was advanced: "If a man has spent time alone with a woman and there were neither legal nor natural obstacles to the performing of sexual intercourse and subsequently he divorced her (as well as without the committing of 'sexual intercourse,'—F.I.), in this instance the dowry goes to her completely" [4, p 179]. The following argument was made in response to this notion: "The spouse should be considered the possessed object of a marriage contract only with intercourse *de facto* [4, [179], otherwise "only one-half the dowry should be paid" [ibid.].

However, there are also arguments in favor of the first notion: "In this instance the wife should be considered as carrying out her duty in the marriage contract by the fact that the object of the contract has been delivered by her and, within the measure depending upon her, all obstacles have been removed for the man to take possession of this object thereby establishing and affirming her right to the dowry which serves as payment for the delivery of the designated object. This instance is analogous to a case of buying and selling, when the seller offers to deliver the given property and the purchaser does not bother to take possession of what he has acquired...." [4, p 180].

The debate becomes more apparent when the issue is raised of the marriage of a "majbub," that is, a eunuch. "Since the law requires the presence of a genital organ, regardless of its ability for an erection" [4, p 180], a man in this instance may be offered a "rebate" as in the instance of sickness as he is "even less capable of cohabiting than the sick man" [ibid.].

For this reason, in a divorce the woman should receive one-half of the dowry. The argument against the latter thesis is that "the woman is obliged only to deliver the object of the marriage (so that the husband could touch and feel it)" [ibid.].

The given fragment of the discussion of the problem rather eloquently shows the place of woman in the Islamic world. In truth, here one could argue that the given dispute is out of date. But, M. Qaddafi at present states that "the East views her (woman.—F.I.) as the subject of buying and selling" [3, p 129].

In our poll, the students were asked the questions of whether bride money reduces the dignity of the woman and the man. In speaking about women some 44.6 percent of those questioned marked an alternative to "reduces," while 11.7 percent supported the opposite viewpoint of "on the contrary it increases it." There were very large (up to 30 percent) fluctuations over the republics in the share of those who marked the given positions. However, the number of persons indicating a position of "reduces" was greater everywhere.

A different picture existed over the question of opinions of whether or not the bride money humiliates the man. As a whole for the region, 34.2 percent of the respondents assumed that the bride money humiliates a man and 17.5 percent considered the reverse. But for the republics there was no uniform viewpoint on this question. Thus, in Kirghizia the share of those supporting the opinion that the bride money ennobles a man was 7 percent greater than those seeing a humiliation here. In Kazakhstan there was virtually no difference between the indicators. Then in Turkmenia, the number of respondents considering the bride money to be humiliation for the man was 50.8 percent higher than those who saw the reverse.

The poll showed a very substantial discrepancy between the state of affairs prior to October 1917 and at the end of the 1980s. While previously virtually all marriages were performed with the paying of bride money, at present this happens in 68 cases out of 100. As an average over the designated period of time, the number of marriages involving bride money has annually declined by almost 0.5 percent.

There has also been a change in the view of bride money as in accord with traditional views "the payment of the dowry was established by law merely as an indication of respect for the object of the marriage, the woman" [4, p 175]. At present, the viewpoint prevails that the bride money is not only a "mark of respect" for the woman but can also humiliate the man himself.

Let us draw attention to a remarkable fact that to a significant degree the woman has ceased to be the "object of the law"⁴ in now acting as its subject [principal].⁵ In truth, we cannot say to what degree the transition has occurred and merely offer this as an observation by the author.

The attempt at an empirical interpretation of the given process in the stage of elaborating the instrumentarium developed into a very hypothetical scheme which might evoke serious argument from the professionals who are oriented toward the object-subject coordinates of the legal space of the research. Nevertheless, the obtained information provides a visual notion of the state of the studied phenomenon.

The students were asked the question "What is bride money: an act of buying and selling or a tribute of respect to the bride's family?"⁶ Some 19.7 percent of the respondents viewed the bride money as a "manifestation of respect" and 31.3 percent as a "buy and sell" (the remainder found it difficult to reply). In interpreting the obtained results, we will assume that in the instance when the bride money is viewed as an act of buying and selling, the woman acts as an object of the law and when the bridal purchase is seen as a tribute of respect to the bride's family, the woman is now acting in the role of a subject [principal] of the law. Proceeding from the given considerations, it can be concluded that in the given region the woman to a larger degree acts as the object of the law (31.3 percent) than she does its subject [principal] (19.7 percent).

From the appeal of the groom to the father of the bride (7th Century A.D.):

My bride money I give to you,
I purchase my fate,
I do not hide my misgivings,
But it is time for us to become related [6]

(translation by VI. Gershuni)

In fact, the entire dispute over the bride money arose over its amount. In actuality, a gold coin would have sufficed for this procedure and the problem, it must be assumed, would not have arisen. If the action were a symbolic one, without a real social load, probably in the first years of Soviet power it would not have been declared outside the law and the persons who crossed the line (paid and accepted the bride money) would not be thrown in prison. The bride purchase acquired the status of an important social mechanism only "when incarnate" in large amounts of money.⁷

From the materials of our poll, the average amount of the bride money in the region was around 8,500 rubles. Is this a lot or a little? From the viewpoint of a young person who has reached the age of marriage and is confronted with the question of where to find such an amount of money, it is an enormous sum. Particularly if one considers that in addition

to this the relatives of the groom spend approximately 4,000 rubles on holding the wedding. But what are the canonic views of Islam on this question? The medieval sources have come down to us as follows: "Ten dargims is the smallest amount of the dowry under the law" [4, p 174]. I have been unable to find in the encyclopedias and dictionaries any explanation of how much silver or gold was contained in the designated monetary unit. Incidentally, it can be pointed out that 10 dargims "was the smallest amount for the theft of which the law prescribed the cutting off of a limb" [4, p 175].

In our view, it is possible to resolve the problem of comparing the amount of bride money in the 7th Century (the rise of Islam) and in the 20th, if in the search for a scale of measurement we turn to the heritage of English classic political economy. We have in mind the principles of the labor theory of value worked out by A. Smith, where labor or more precisely working time is used for the comparison.

The Prophet Mohammed, not being a political economist and probably due to the existence of the customs then existing in Arabia, used precisely this criterion. In the previously mentioned marriage of Moses, the content of the marriage contract presented by the father of the bride in its koranic wording reads as follows: "I want you to marry one of my daughters so you will remain with me for 8 years" (4; 27). Thus, the "price of a bride" in accord with the "Book of Books" was the amount of working time contained in the designated number of years.

Of course, the figures offered below are very tentative, but, nevertheless, can provide material for a comparison. As a point of departure, let us take the average wages for the region in 1988. If we deduct from this the income tax and the obligatory trade union payments, then we obtain a figure of around 200 rubles. In considering that the father of the bride would have to feed and clothe Moses, it would be necessary to deduct from the obtained 200 rubles the appropriate amount. Let us turn to the opinion of economists who estimate that the subsistence minimum in the USSR during this period was 100 rubles. It would turn out that for paying off (working off) the bride money, there would be 100 rubles remaining. If we multiply this amount by 12 months and then by 8 years, in today's terms the amount of the marriage payment would be 9,600 rubles.

In comparing the obtained amount with the figure disclosed as a result of the poll (8,500 rubles), we come to the conclusion that the real and imperative amounts of money are (considering the error of measurement) comparable. And the "orthodox Moslems" fully support the "classic" canons of marital price formation, although, judging from everything, they do not suspect this.

However, to detect the presence of a certain pattern (if this is not a mere coincidence) still does not mean to explain it. It remains unclear why precisely during the time of Mohammed it would take 8 years to buy off a wife.

Let us examine the price-forming factors in accord with which the classic "marriage calculation" was formulated. The first factor was the "precedent" that is, "the woman benefits from a dowry which is usually given to the female side through the paternal line" [4, p 197].

The second factor is the ratio of the statuses of the tribes of the groom and the bride. The validity of employing this factor is based upon the following considerations: "The value of an article can be determined only by taking into account the value of the category to which it applies" [4, [197]. Here, preference is given to the instance of equal statuses since: "The desirable consequences such as marital congress, contact and friendship can be used equally only by persons who are equal among themselves" [4, p 165]. A characteristic detail is that the woman should not marry a man whose social status is lower than hers as this is a "dishonor" [ibid.].

Further, in setting the amount of the price, the girls are compared for the following factors: age, beauty, wealth and good conduct. Also taken into account is the place of residence and the "circumstances" (tumultuous and difficult times in comparison with calm and peaceful ones). Finally, there is the tenth factor: "In addition, in the opinion of persons informed about the law, they must also consider equality in relation to virginity, as the amount of the dowry differs for a virgin and for a sayiba" [ibid.].

We have listed the factors influencing the amount of the price in such detail because all of them at present have maintained their importance. In truth, the ratio of the statuses of the tribes of the bride and groom now plays a smaller role.

In our research we have not set the goal of thoroughly analyzing the influence of various factors on the amount of the bride money. For this reason here we give only the most general data. In response to the question of what qualities in a girl increase the amount of the bride money, three main factors were pointed out: 1) "the ability to run the house"

(mentioned by 39.0 percent of those questioned; the maximum value was given to this factor by the Tajiks with 52.5 percent); 2) "beauty and appearance" (31.9 percent); the given factor had the strongest influence among the Azeris with 47.7 percent); 3) "family reputation" (28.3 percent; the most significant was among the Kazakhs with 41.7 percent).

As for virginity, this was in sixth place after "higher education"⁸ (24.4 percent) and "moral-psychological qualities" (18.6 percent), receiving 11.6 percent of the votes. The maximum value for this indicator was in Kazakhstan (21.6 percent). The comparatively low rating of virginity can be explained by the fact that the given feature of the bride is automatically expected in the region. Thus, one of the respondents, in answering the question about the qualities of a girl, wrote in the questionnaire: "To demand an increase in bride money for virginity is the same thing as establishing a surcharge on the price of a watermelon or its roundness." (It must be said that in certain oblasts of the region they grow oblong watermelons and here they are cheaper than the round ones because of the very thick rind). Moreover, not every bride is a virgin (this has been one of the reasons for the "prewedding suicides" [8]), and the cost of the surgical "restoration of virginity" has been constantly increasing.

Incidentally, a study of how the individual factors influence the amount of bride money is a secondary question. Here we have studied the reasons for the deviation from the average (for the separate region, oblast and republic). Here no reasons can explain the rise of a difference in the amount of the bride money between the oblasts and the republics. The fluctuations are quite substantial: from 4,206 rubles in Kirghizia to 17,978 rubles in Turkmenia (see Table 2). In considering that the standard of living in the republics is approximately the same, the factor giving rise to such substantial discrepancies remains unclear.

Table 2: Basic Economic Indicators for a Bride-Money Marriage

Republics	% of Marriages Concluded With Paying of Bride Money	Expenditures by Groom, Rubles		Expenditures by Bride, Rubles		The "Profit" Remaining for the Bride's Parents After the Marriage, Rubles	Excess of Expenditures for Groom's Side, Rubles	Index of Bride Money*
		Amount of Bride Money	Expenditures on Wedding	Amount for Sep	Expenditures on Wedding			
Azerbaijan	51.8	7,981	6,163	6,426	3,797	-2,242	3,921	20
Kazakhstan	59.2	4,256	3,060	2,185	1,896	+175	3,235	19
Kirghizia	79.8	4,206	2,394	2,046	1,955	+205	2,599	21
Tajikistan	66.8	7,017	4,142	2,914	2,028	+2,075	6,217	42
Turkmenia	80.0	17,978	4,278	5,249	2,596	+10,233	14,511	116
Uzbekistan	67.3	6,397	4,403	3,367	2,682	+349	4,752	32
As whole for region	68.2	8,476	3,988	3,560	2,416	+2,500	6,488	44

* Calculated by multiplying the number of marriages concluded with the payment of bride money by the amount of the excess of expenditures by the groom's side.

Incidentally, if we come back to the theoretical baggage of economics and to the now fashionable concept of the "market," one can offer an explanation for the given phenomenon. Let us base our assumption on three initial premises: 1) the bride money is the price of the bride; 2) the bride is a commodity on the marriage market; 3) prices on the market depend upon the balance of supply and demand for the good.

If the amount of the bride money is determined by the relation of supply and demand on the local marriage markets, it is essential to elucidate the factors which influence the designated ratio. Since the "biological factor" or the number of young men and young women of marriageable age and residing on the territory of a certain marriage market "does not work" here, then it remains for us to seek out the determination in the strictly market sphere or the social one.

A Frontier Without Border Troops

Let us recall the old market story. Because of unforeseen circumstances, two persons have ended up in an uninhabited desert. One of them has a lot of money while the other has a lot of bread and suet. Now starving, the person with the money asks the second for some food. The other proposes:

"Let us organize a market. I will make the sandwiches, I will sit down and I will sell them and you will come in and buy."

Having made the sandwiches, he sat down to sell them. The "buyer" comes up and, pointing to the smallest sandwich, asks:

"How much does it cost, please?"

"Three hundred rubles."

"But why so much?"

"You can walk through the market and possibly find it for less!"

There is an analogous situation on the marriage market of the region as the basic price-forming factor here is its exclusiveness. The frontiers of this market cannot be detected visually as they run in the minds of people. And this frontier involves confessional, subethnic, national and even tribal barriers. The given terms how clear and firm are the endogamic frontiers⁹ determines the size of the marriage market and the ratio of supply and demand on it. The bride money will be as great as the social norms prescribing the intratribal and intranational marriages are strong. In Turkmenia the intratribal imperatives are stronger than in the other republics and for this reason the price of the bride there is incomparably higher than in the other republics.

Generally, the marriage market has several frontiers and these are superimposed on one another like a Russian wooden doll. The initial frontiers are the tribal (not in all republics). If, for instance, the bride and groom are from different tribes then the price for the bride will, as a rule, be higher than within the tribe as they sell more dearly to "outsiders."

Then comes the national exclusiveness of the marriage market and this is probably the strongest. With the reticence to conclude a marriage outside of the nationality, it still is possible to have the moving from the national into the subethnic sphere. In particular, the Azeris, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Turkmen and Uzbeks are related to the Turkic-speaking community and marriage within these frontiers is considered "admissible."

There is an analogous situation with confessional affiliation and this is stronger than the subethnic. The indigenous population of the region is of Moslem origin and marriage between different nations and subethnoses is also admissible (it is not censured) if the persons getting married are "Moslems" with the Tajiks being added here to the five above-listed Turkic-speaking peoples. There is also a dependence between in which of the listed marriage markets the marriage contract is drawn up and the size of the payment.

The structure of the markets and the clarity of their frontiers is most fully apparent in Turkmenia. The maximum bride money is within the tribal market. Here there is a great differentiation with prices in one region exceeding the prices in another by several fold. For this reason, if the groom leaves the intratribal market, within the general-national one he may acquire a bride for comparatively little bride money. If we view the subethnic or the general confessional levels, here prices are even lower. For this reason in Turkmenia, for example, there is the phenomenon of "importing" of brides. There are "middle man offices" which for a moderate payment will bring in brides from other "Moslem" regions. Naturally here the bride money (including the payment of the middle-man services) is significantly less than on the territory of the groom.

The confessional frontiers of the market are broad and include the Moslems of the Northern Caucasus, the Transcaucasus, Tataria and elsewhere. However, they are the limit for the traditional view.

In speaking about the extreme undesirability of marriages with persons of another faith, one should note the very substantial fact that the given question cannot be considered as resting on the religious primary sources. The Prophet Mohammed, as no one else, knew how much Islam was a successor to Judaism and Christianity. Probably because of this the Koran permits orthodox Moslems to take Christians and Jewesses as wives.

But let us return to the question of the relationship between the degree (strength) of endogamy and the amount of the marriage price. In terms of the strength of the endogamic barriers, the described republics can be broken down into three groups. The first group where endogamy is strong is represented by Turkmenia, and there the amount of the bride money is significantly higher than in the other republics. The second group is formed from republics with a medium strength of endogamy and here the marriage payment fluctuates within the limits of 6,000-8,000 rubles. Finally, the third group (weak endogamy) includes Kazakhstan and Kirghizia with bride money of around 4,000 rubles (see Table 3).

Table 3: Endogamy and Bride Money*

Republics	Degree of Endogamy	Amount of Bride Money, 1,000 Rubles	Distribution of Answers by Republics, %		
			"The older generation is the strongest supporters of bride money"	"Bride money and love are incompatible"	"Bride money is a manifestation of respect"
Turkmenia	Strong	18	25	54	8
Azerbaijan	Medium	6-8	45-54	46-51	13-19
Tajikistan					
Uzbekistan					
Kazakhstan	Weak	4	63-64	39-41	29-37
Kirghizia					
As whole for republic	Medium	8	50	47	20

* All the figures have been rounded off to whole numbers.

The "market" determination of the amount of bride money is illustrated by the situation which has come into being on the marriage market of Tashkent (at the moment of conducting our poll). Here the bride money is often symbolic of some 300-500 rubles (with an average of 6,500 rubles for the republic). The sep at times exceeds it by several fold, that is, in essence a groom is "purchased" and not a bride. Such a situation is explained by the specific factors existing on the marriage market. On the one hand, there is a large percentage of a foreign (not Turkic-Moslem) population (the objective factor). On the other hand, there are the certain "eurocentric" cultural orientation (including for the institution of a dowry) and the comparatively weak endogamic views among the youth (the subjective factor). These "national grooms" must be "purchased" so they do not take "free" foreign brides.

The strength and viability of social norms to a significant degree depend upon what social strata and age groups are their active supporters. In our poll we established which generation represents the strongest supporters of the bride money. The oldest (grandmothers and grandfathers) were named by 49.5 percent of the respondents, the middle-aged and older (the parents of the bride and groom) by 23.4 percent; 18.6 percent found it difficult to reply. A comparison of the republics for these indicators disclosed a strong differentiation in the replies (see Table 3). In Turkmenia the oldest generation was mentioned by around 25 percent of the persons questioned; in the group with a medium degree of endogamy by from 45 to 54 percent, and in the third group this indicator was 63-64 percent. It was quite obvious that there was a linkage between the endogamy, the amount of the bride money and the relative activeness of the oldest generation with the higher the designated activeness the lower the bride money and the weaker the endogamy.

At first glance, this seems to be a paradox. Seemingly, it should be the other way around with the more strongly the older generation favoring the customs the more unswervingly these would be carried out. The given assumption is based on a new social myth according to which in the described region the authority of the oldest generation (the aksakals) is unassailable. In actuality, such a situation is

characteristic only for a classic patriarchal way of life. But within a patriarchal-totalitarian system, the real influence, including moral, shifts to the power structures within which is the middle-aged (45-60 years of age) generation.

For this reason, for instance, in Kazakhstan, the most active supporters of the bride money are the oldest generation but, in possessing comparatively weak real power and influence, it cannot impose its views. But in Turkmenia the reverse is true: the highest percentage (35.3 percent) of supporters for the bride money is to be found among the older and middle-aged generation (as a whole for the region 23.4 percent). This generation as the most active supporter of the idea of bride money is also capable of imposing its will on others.

Where the bride money is higher, correspondingly, its "pressure" on the youth is stronger and its negative consequences more serious. Thus, in Turkmenia, to a greater degree than in the other republics, bride money prevents the realization of a marriage out of love. Here also is the lowest share of respondents who view the bride money as a manifestation of respect (see Table 3).

Where Is the Marriage Caravan Going?

The Islamic question is assuming ever-greater timeliness in the modern world. The movements of Islamic fundamentalists and innovators have attracted heightened attention among the scholars and leaders of various states. The political and economic development of the Islamic countries bears many obscure points and entails obscure demands and fears. Against this background, particular significance is assumed by an analysis of the social processes occurring in the Moslem republics of the Soviet Union. In considering the marked centrifugal movement of the "sovereign states comprising the USSR," it must be pointed out that the independence of the "Moslem republics" can have a marked influence on the world's fate as certainly the inclusion of them in the "world Islamic process" is capable of altering the balance of forces on the political map of the world.

In this context, research on the trends in the social development of the region's republic assumes particular interest. For this reason, even such a phenomenon as the marriage purchase can attract attention by its ability to reflect the development of social movement. Above we have examined such indicators as the percentage of marriages concluded with the payment of bride money as well as the amount of the latter. A statistical link is absent between these. It would be difficult to speak about the trends in the change of a marriage for money. If one were to proceed from the theoretical notions concerning the evolution of the marriage for money, then the proportionality of the exchange of gifts should be the indicator of it. A difference in the expenditures on the marriage between the bride and groom side points to a transition from the purchased marriage to an "unpurchased" one.

Let us disregard the moral aspect in answering the question of whether or not the bride money is an act of buying and selling and move on to the economic criteria. Let us examine the marriage contract from the viewpoint of its advantage for the "selling side." Incidentally, the word "bride money" ["kalym"] (the etymology is not completely clear) is consonant with the word which translates from Turkic into Russian as "remainder" and this, incidentally, is close to the meaning which has been invested in this word by the Russians ("kalymit" [to make money on the side]).

So, from the designated viewpoint the republics can be divided into four groups: high-income, medium-income and no-income as well as loss. In Turkmenia the parents receive the maximum "skim" (over 10,000 rubles) from a marriage transaction. This is followed by Tajikistan where the profit is on the regional average level and is over 2,000 rubles. The parents of the bride in Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Uzbekistan receive virtually no income. In Azerbaijan, on the contrary, the bride's side contributes its share of money (see Table 2).

In answering the question of how often the parents endeavor to receive more bride money for their daughter and pay less for the son for a bride, the following opinions were voiced: 43.9 percent said "always" and "often" (the highest indicator in Turkmenia with 66.6 percent); 23.4 percent found it difficult to reply. As we see, a significant portion of the students feels that for their parents mercenary interests are not the last matter in a marriage contract.

However, the profitability of a marriage transaction for the parents of the groom is an important indicator but not a too informative one. For this reason, let us examine the difference in the marriage expenditures by the side of the groom and the bride. In comparing the total amounts from both sides, it turns out that the expenditures by the groom exceed the expenditures by the bride. The latter indicator fully reflects to what degree the concluded marriage is one for money. As is seen from Table 2, the excess of expenditures by the groom runs from 2,600 rubles in Kirghizia to 14,500 rubles in Turkmenia.

We again are forced to return to the problem of measuring the prevalence of bride money. Certainly, the indicator for the percentage of bride-money marriages and the exceeding of expenditures by the groom side contradict one another. It is not clear which of them should be used for ranking the republics in terms of the degree of bride money and an analysis of the trend.

If, for instance, in a republic the percentage of bride-money marriages equals 100 percent but their total amount was symbolic, for example, 25 rubles, then there would be no problem. In the opposite case of a large bride money but an insignificant percentage of its prevalence, one also would not speak about a major social phenomenon.

Clearly, the number of bride-money marriages is a more informative indicator, however it is difficult to compare in comparing the republics. We feel that the degree of payment for marriage or how much the groom's side pays more can adequately "consider" the percentage of marriages for money. For this reason, we have constructed an index of bride money which represents the product of the percentage of bride-money marriages and the amount of the exceeding of expenditures by the groom's side. The obtained values of the index make it possible to compare the republics in terms of the degree of the presence of bride money. As is seen from Table 2, the greatest value for the index of bride money is in Turkmenia (116) then followed by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (respectively, 42 and 43). The lowest level of the importance of bride money is in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kirghizia (20).

Students—The Barometer of the Nation

The nation, and particularly the studied region, is living through hard times. For this reason, at present it is difficult to find the guidelines in accord with which one can determine the vector for the political movement of the republics. The centripetal movement of the components of the Union, in being accompanied by an increase in national self-awareness and separatism has led to a situation where a political forecast becomes more a matter of the astrologers than the scientists. In any event, the former do this more frequently and willingly than do the latter and, most importantly, more confidently.

Social experience shows that the current attitude of the students in the republics to bride money reflects their attitude also toward democratic values and hence is capable of having a definite impact on the choice of the way. A portion of those questioned (45.2 percent) condemns the bride money (only 8.9 percent approves). Probably this is related to the fact that almost one-half of the respondents (48.1 percent) consider bride money as harmful for the development of the nation (6.3 percent were certain of its benefit).

The following are seen as the main negative consequences of a marriage for money: the groom's side is put in a difficult

economic situation (14 percent of those questioned); this has a destructive effect on the family and on the relations between relatives (12.3 percent); the reasons "discrimination against women" and "psychological and moral harm" were noted by each of 8 percent of the respondents. Those who saw positive aspects in a marriage for money noted first of all the material support for the young family (6.7 percent) and the maintaining of national traditions and culture (5.4 percent).

More reliable information on the future of the marriage for money was provided by the answer to the question: "Do you want in the marriage of your children for bride money to be paid?" Some 64.1 percent of those questioned replied "no" while 6.8 percent said "yes" and 25.5 percent said "it is still hard to say." At the same time, only 37.7 percent of the respondents assumed that "the bride money will disappear without fail"; 20.2 percent said "there will always be bride money" and 30.1 percent found it difficult to reply.

What is the forecast of the "optimists"? They assume that bride money will disappear in...43 years. An interesting coincidence has arisen with 43 years as an average for the region and 43 years for the three individual republics (Azerbaijan, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan). If one believes in the magic of numbers, then this forecast must be taken into account.

One of the main arguments by the supporters of bride money is that bride money contributes to the strength of the marriage. In actuality, statistical data indicate that in the "bride money" regions the divorce rate is much lower than in zones with "democratic" marriage. However, the stability of a family in and of itself may not be, like the social stability of society, an indicator of well-being. For example, the highest social stability existed in the USSR during the years of Stalinism.

Let us examine the factors which form the low birthrate under conditions of a patriarchal way of life. In the first place, there is the ethical paradigm which prevails in the common mind and in accord with which the woman should hold a subdominant position in the family and society and uncomplainingly endure the inconveniences of her status. Moreover, the moral imperatives of the mentioned paradigm prescribe that the men and woman must endure any dissatisfaction in the marriage for the sake of maintaining the family and the entire system of kinship which arose through the given marriage. It must also be recalled that even 40 years ago the region virtually did not know divorce.

Secondly, the widespread nature of those situations which could be equated to latent divorces. The woman is in a hopeless situation (in the instance of a divorce, as a rule, she has nowhere to live and no means of support), and for this reason her dissatisfaction with the marriage may not find any practical outcome. And the man, having paid large bride money, often does not have any more money to pay for a new wife after the divorce. For this reason, in a situation of dissatisfaction with the marriage, he also prefers to "keep things as they were."

With a marriage for money, both sides are not free and for this reason the low percentages of divorce largely reflect

only the degree of personal enslavement of the spouses. The patriarchal totalitarian way of life impedes any mobility, including marital.

The above-described index of "bride money" can be viewed as an indicator of marital immobility (enslavement), understanding by this the degree of the lack of freedom in choosing a marriage partner. As is known, the free will of an individual grows proportionately to the democraticness of society as a whole. If we turn to the values shown in Table 2 for the index of the "bride money" and compare this with information reflecting the intensity of democratic movements in the described republics, we will note that the amounts of the designated index are inversely proportional to sociopolitical activeness.

We asked the students "Under what circumstances could young people abandon the payment of bride money?" Mentioned among the first were "love" (11.2 percent) and "the will of the young" (7.2 percent). Such an "antibride-money" factor as social progress was mentioned by 1 out of every 25 students. Subsequently polls will show how the "factor of social progress" is behaving in the Turkic-Tajik region.

Footnotes

1. The characteristics of the poll have been given in greater detail in [1].
2. Below in the quotations of the Koran in the parentheses we give the number of the Surah and after the semicolon the number of the Ayat.
3. It is essential to bear in mind that in the Turkic-speaking republics the bride money is paid and in Tajikistan, the "makhr." Below these concepts are employed as synonyms.
4. The object of the law is the "things (articles) over which social relations arise and governed by one or another branch of law (for example, a home can become...the object of personal property law)" [5, p 208].
5. The subject [principal] of law is the person possessing the ability under the law to possess and carry out rights and legal duties [5, p 358].
6. Precisely respect for the bride's family and not for the bride herself, as in contrast to the "makhr" the bride money is paid to her parents.
7. The central press has mentioned the maximum amount of bride money in Turkmenia (30-40,000 rubles). The impression may be formed that it is a matter of cash. But the reality is much more complex and richer. It can be imagined only having become acquainted with the fact that the Turkmen term the "ispisek" the manuscript presented to the groom's side. This is bride money in its natural-monetary expression. The Turkmen weekly LITERATURA I ISKUSSTVO has published such a list. In addition to 16,000 rubles in cash, it also included the names of 298 different things. Translated into "pure money," considering the prices on the black market, the specific bride money would be around 50,000 rubles and it would be considered in the category of a "heavy robe" (agyr khalat [gown]), that is, the maximum [7].

8. Possibly because the poll was carried out among university students, the weight of the given factor was significantly more than among the region's population as a whole.

9. Endogamy is a custom by which marriages are permitted only between persons of the same social group (tribe, estate, caste and so forth).

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Refugees

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[Article by Igor Anatolyevich Zlokazov, candidate of economic sciences. This is the first time he appears in our magazine]

[Text] The lack of a solution to the problem of nationality relations in the USSR, their exacerbation and, as a consequence, the appearance of refugees has been largely caused by the particular features of the demographic development in the regions.

The most important factor for sociopolitical attention has been the interrepublic migration which has noticeably distorted the nationality composition of a number of the nation's territories.

This has been most obviously expressed in the Baltic Republics. According to information from the Latvian Ministry of the Economy, during the postwar year almost a million inhabitants of various nationalities, but chiefly Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians, moved here. According to the census data for 1959-1988, the migrational influx into Latvia was 372,000 persons or 63 percent of the total

increase in the population, while for Lithuania the figure was 228,000 (23 percent), and for Estonia 241,000 (64 percent).

The second most important demographic factor for the change in the nationality composition of the USSR has been the birthrate. For the individual nationalities the differences in its level may reach 2 1/2-fold. A substantial differentiation has survived also in the Baltic where, for example, the total birthrate coefficient among the Russians, being one of the lowest in the nation, all the same, surpasses the indicator for the Latvians by 1.2-fold.

As a result of the effect of both factors, the number of Russians in the Baltic has risen by 70 percent over the last 30 years, while for Russians it has doubled and for the Ukrainians tripled. During this same time, understandably, the proportional amount of the indigenous nations has declined: the Estonians in Estonia comprise 61 percent in comparison with 75 percent, while the Latvians in Latvia are 52 percent in comparison with 62 percent. In Lithuania this virtually has remained unchanged (79 percent).

In recent years, construction of major nationally important projects—the result of the extensive development of the economy in this region—in being combined with a low level of mass political culture, has provided grounds for associating the migrants from the RSFSR, the Ukraine and Belorussia who have come to work in this region with the guilty parties for the arising unfavorable demographic situation.

We would point out that in the Baltic Republics, according to the estimates of Western researchers, the intelligentsia and the leading cadres in their majority have been "recruited" from the indigenous nations while on the other hand jobs in industry (low and unskilled professions) have been filled by newcomers. Thus, in Estonia the Russian-speaking population supplies 80 percent of the industrial workers, 91 percent of the construction workers and 75 percent of those employed in transport. Migrants have been employed in the enterprises of heavy industry and for precisely this reason the national movements have brought accusations against these enterprises for creating an ecological crisis in the region.

But here it must not be forgotten that there has been an actually existing influx of highly-skilled manpower into the Baltic and the labor and knowledge of this group have undoubtedly contributed to the region's development. Lithuanian demographers have pointed out, for example, that 60 percent of the migration balance in the republic has been made up (among the adult population) by persons with a higher or specialized secondary education.

The growth of separatist trends in the Baltic, in being superimposed on the interethnic frictions, the sharp deterioration in the socioeconomic, political, ecological and demographic situations and the opposition to the Union structures may well cause a significant departure of the Russian-speaking population—the total number of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians is 2.1 million persons here—to other regions of the nation.

The situation can also deteriorate due to the rise of new migration flows to the major cities as the USSR Armed Forces (including outside the country) are reduced, and their transition to new forms of manning, if there is not an adequate consideration of the consequences of this process on the republic and all-Union levels.

The conversion of the defense economy, in being made more complicated—in the atmosphere of confrontation among the Union and republic governments—by the problem of finding jobs for those working at the Union level enterprises is also leading to the mass and uncontrollable migration pressure on the social infrastructure of the major cities and primarily the Russian Federation. In the given instance it is a question of the demographic factor of sociopolitical instability as well as the demographic factor of unemployment which is accompanied by a decline in the quality of the discharged employee ranks.

In other words, the exacerbation of interethnic relations and the problems of employment—the real components of the present-day socioeconomic and political situation of our nation—are not only the consequence of past migration but also the cause of current and future (potential) migration.

Yes, the economic, ecological and political crisis in the nation, having sharply intensified the lack of confidence in tomorrow, has already caused a wave of forced migrants.

In the strict sense of the word, refugees as such up to last year were absent in our country, as this category, in accord with the UN Convention (1951) includes "persons who due to valid fears of becoming the victim of persecution because of race, religious faith, citizenship, belonging to a certain social group or political convictions remain outside the country of their nationality." The adoption now by a number of the Union and autonomous republics of sovereignty declarations which also provide republic citizenship means the possibility of the appearance of refugees on USSR territory not only defacto but also deure.

The number of forced migrants registered by March 1991—and primarily due to the deepening of conflicts based on

nationality—reached 633,000 persons. Problems related to them have arisen in eight Union republics and many regions of Russia.

The forced migration has gone through three stages. The first was in the winter of 1988-1989. All in all, some 422,000 persons changed their place of residence. Representatives of the indigenous nationalities migrated (from Armenia into Azerbaijan and vice versa). The second stage—the summer of 1989—was marked by the mass departure of the Mesetian Turks from Uzbekistan and they were resettled in the RSFSR (30,000), Azerbaijan (20,000), in the Ukraine (3,000) and in Kazakhstan (2,000). Simultaneously, 9,000 persons left Kazakhstan and these were representatives of the Northern Caucasus nationalities. The third stage commenced in January 1990. The forced migrants were Armenians and Russians (from Azerbaijan) with on the order of 100,000 persons and they found shelter in the RSFSR, Armenia, the Ukraine, Belorussia and Turkmenia and once again the Mesetian Turks who had left Uzbekistan and who moved in small groups into Azerbaijan.

It is important to emphasize that in the Central Asian Republics increasingly there has been an unique cult of the large family and the so-called complex family as indications of the "uniqueness of the nation." Very definite nationalistic groups in society which do not wish to lose their positions act as the agents and proponents of such political-demographic views which speculate on national self-awareness. Precisely they, being a part of the scientific personnel, the soviet and party "managers," are currently endeavoring at any price to preserve or seize power, relying here on an ideology of national, tribal or clan exclusiveness.

The pressure of these groups against the background of the growing influence of Islam in the Central Asian region, the unemployment, the ecological and political miscalculations of the state and the activating of mafioso elements have already led to a sharp strengthening of the migration of nonindigenous nationalities from there.

Important factors in ethnomigration are not only the confederative trends in the sociopolitical life of the regions and the growth of nationalism but also the constantly recreated and notorious "image of the enemy" in the mass mind of the "aborigines," and the real threat of a civil war.

Potential of Slavic-Speaking Reimmigration in 1989 (Thousand Persons)

Republic	Russians	Ukrainians	Belorussians	Total	Share of Total Number of Population, %
Russia	119,873	4,360	1,206	5,566*	3.8*
Ukraine	11,356	37,419	440	11,796*	23.8*
Belorussian	1,342	291	7,905	1,633*	16.0*
Uzbekistan	1,653	153	—	1,806	11.7
Kazakhstan	6,228	896	183	7,307	44.4
Georgia	341	52	9	402	7.4
Azerbaijan	392	32	—	424	7.3
Lithuania	344	45	63	452	12.2
Moldavia	562	600	20	1,182	27.3
Latvia	906	92	120	1,118	41.9

Potential of Slavic-Speaking Reimmigration in 1989 (Thousand Persons) (Continued)

Republic	Russians	Ukrainians	Belorussians	Total	Share of Total Number of Population, %
Kirghizia	917	108	9	1,034	24.3
Tajikistan	388	41	7	436	8.6
Armenia	52	8	—	60	1.8
Turkmenia	334	36	9	379	10.8
Estonia	475	48	28	551	35.2
Total	145,163	44,181	9,999	341,146	

* Without counting persons of the indigenous nationality. Calculated from: "Ob itogakh Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1989" [On the Results of the All-Union 1989 Population Census], Moscow, Goskomstat SSSR, 1990, pp 28-35.

The ethnodemographic situation in the USSR steadily feeds the forced migration. In 1959-1988, the proportional amount of the Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian population taken as a whole, as a consequence of the low reproduction indicators, dropped from 76 to 70 percent and just for the Russians, from 55 to 51 percent. During these years, there was a doubling in the proportional amount of the indigenous nations of Central Asia while the share of peoples of the Transcaucasus increased by 1.5-fold. Simultaneously, there was a gradual ethnic concentration of the latter peoples and this intensified sharply in our recent past. At the same time, there has been an ongoing substantial eroding of the Slavic-speaking ethnoses with 25 million Russians, 7 million Ukrainians and 2 million Belorussians continuing to live outside their ethnic range. This is markedly opposed by the phenomenon of their reimmigration (the given table shows the power of the potential which this possesses): while in 1959-1978, Russia lost 1.5 million persons as a result of migration, in the 1980s, its population grew predominantly due to this category of forced migrants by almost 2 million.

The maintaining of the negative socioeconomic and political trends in the foreseeable future will contribute to the appearance and strengthening of fundamentally new types of refugees and this will entail serious negative consequences for society.

In addition to migration due to economic reasons, from the regions struck by structural unemployment, one must expect a mass and, most importantly, uncontrolled movement from zones of ecological disaster (the number of refugees for ecological reasons has been estimated by Western specialists at 1 million persons and the potential migration as a consequence of the Chernobyl disaster is 4 million). Sharp changes in the public mind, in being exacerbated by the possibility of economic disaster and, naturally, a social outburst in any part of the USSR, could lead to the formation of a broad flow of migrants for political reasons.

The growth of nationalism in the various regions is fraught not only with a growing scale of Slavic-speaking reimmigration but also by a sharp outflow of foreign manpower. In this instance, we cannot exclude a deterioration in the foreign political contacts of the Soviet Union.

The fanning of antiarmy hysteria, in being accompanied by illegal actions in the Baltic Republics, Moldavia and

Georgia, is capable of leading to an escalation of local armed conflicts, cause a definite demoralization of the army as well as hard-to-predict processes among the servicemen, including desertion.

Let us emphasize that the rise of the institution of refugee status entails primarily a deepening of sociopolitical instability, the danger of a turn to the right and the collapse of perestroika as a whole. Even now, as the experience of the Transcaucasus indicates, refugees are a substantial component part in the social base of extremism. Also extremely alarming is the concentration in Moscow, Leningrad and also the border points of enormous masses of Soviet people awaiting permission to leave for abroad.

It is also essential to consider the socioeconomic consequences of forced migration such as the absolute shortage of labor resources in a number of regions, the paralysis of certain economic sectors, particularly in the Central Asian Republics, the overload on the social infrastructure in the sites where refugees have concentrated, in being accompanied by a polluting of the environment and by increased morbidity and mortality.

In a word, the existing situation requires an immediate response from the appropriate state bodies. For an acute need has arisen for an organic coordinating in the main areas for the development of the economy and social sphere, for the placement of the productive forces and for organizing a national market with a solution to the problems of demography, its composition and movement. This presupposes a systematic carrying out of ethnodemographic expert assessment of socioeconomic and political plans and the reconciling of the interests of all the nations and nationalities residing on the nation's territory.

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Track Facilities: People on the Rails

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[Article by Irina Vladimirovna Kolesnikova, candidate of philosophical sciences, assistant on the Philosophy Chair of the Moscow Institute for Rail Transport Engineers. This is the first time she appears in our journal]

[Text] The concrete sociological study on the subject of "Determining the Priority Areas for the Social Development of Track Facilities on the Railroads of the Nonchernozem Zone" in being carried out in 1989-1990, was initiated by the MPS [Ministry of Railways] due to the tragically known accident involving the express Aurora in the town of Bologoye on the October Railroad during the summer of 1988. The research was aimed at elaborating a range of practical recommendations focused on such changes in the sphere of social policy on the railroad which would make it possible to reduce personnel turnover and would contribute to the forming of a positive motivation for high-quality labor among the workers of the track facilities (TF).

As the basic methods we employed: an analysis of the objective documents, a semiformalized interviewing of the employees, an expert questioning, the use of questionnaires, the correlation analysis of the statistical information as well as mathematical statistics methods.

The research task was to disclose who was satisfied with what and, consequently, settled into the given job and who was dissatisfied with what and, consequently, acted as an enzyme for instability in the personnel. This was the first purpose; secondly, to assess the degree of conformity of both those satisfied and dissatisfied with those objective demands which are made on the TF workers at present.

The object of the study was the labor collectives at the enterprises of the Bologoye Division of the October Railroad and the Yaroslavl Division of the Moscow Railroad (below we will term them the "Bologians" and the "Muscovites"). The pilot study was carried out in the winter of 1989 and the questionnaire in June-July 1989. As a total we questioned 140 Bologians (track installers, repairmen, workers from other specialties, brigade leaders, foremen and senior road foremen) and 78 Muscovites; in addition, we took 38 unformalized interviews. The representativeness of the studied aggregate (at least 10 percent of the number of track installers and brigade leaders) provides an opportunity to extrapolate the research results to all track sections of both the Bologoye as well as the Yaroslavl railroad divisions. All the more as the questionnaire poll was carried out according to a random sample, and the track sections were determined as a result of expert assessments considering that both good and bad collectives fell into the field of the research.

In the present article we will take up only certain aspects of the research related, in our view, with the essential sociological characteristics of the contingent of track workers.

The age-old experience of railroad operations has been encapsulated in a saying about the guilt of the switchman, the lowest level in the hierarchy of railroad professions. A capacious saying, it reflects not only our traditional practice of retribution according to the principle "in front of the strong the powerless is always guilty," but also profound patterns in the activities of the railroad. The problem is that with any placement of the correct and the guilty, with any miscalculations on the most diverse levels, all events, including dramatic ones, inevitably occur on the rails and

this places the imprint of "tragic guilt" on the personnel servicing them. Not so long ago as a result of the ubiquitous distribution of the so-called Belorussian method, this profession was abolished. However, the railroad track and the necessity of maintaining it in order have survived. As before, more accurately more often than before (the statistics on this question are classified) the trains "fall." And while there are no more switchmen, guilty parties, of course, have remained. These are the track workers and foremen. They can always be recognized from their orange vests. The bright spots against the background of the muddy-gray railroad reality are particularly noticeable. Who are these people to whom we literally entrust our fate in opening the car door? Before answering this question, let us endeavor—within the tradition of the materialistic practice—to provide a most general sketch of track life.

The activities of any subdivision of a railroad ultimately are aimed at carrying out the plan for passenger and freight shipments. In this process the crucial factor is the state of the railroad embankment, the subject of the activities of the TF. Under the conditions of traffic intensification and the combining of express and freight traffic, the maintaining of the state of the embankment on the proper level—according to the idea—is impossible without using modern equipment and this—also according to the idea—requires from the personnel in addition to energy expenditures responsibility, discipline, competence and a capacity for independent decisions.

In fact, the TF make an impression of being the state's poor stepchild, so far away is reality from an elementary, seemingly, norm. The essentially fundamental sphere of the railroad has acquired the significance of a subordinate, dependent one primarily upon the traffic service and the priority of track equipment in emergency situations is not maintained and the schedule for granting "technological open spaces" for carrying out preventive work is constantly violated. As for material and technical support, the residual principle prevails. Otherwise, the shortage of virtually all material components in production activity would not be so flagrant. Thus, the following indicate what is not to their liking (% of those replying):

	In Moscow	In Bologoye
—Supply of necessary materials	80.0	95.1
—State of repair facilities	82.0	93.3
—Duration of maintenance clear tracks	50.0	67.5
—Supply of equipment	36.9	51.9
—Wearing life of special clothing	76.7	87.5

A predominant majority of those questioned pointed to the necessity of using equipment, and, in the opinion of 86.5 percent of the Bologians and 78 percent of the Muscovites, such a need arises virtually always or rather often. But the possibility of employing equipment in the work process is

lacking. In an extreme instance this was pointed out by 88.7 percent of the respondents in Bologoye and 86.7 percent in Moscow. Most often they refer to the fact that it simply is in short supply and what is available is in an unsatisfactory state. Ultimately all of this tells on the nature of the work in the TF and where the share of manual, physical labor is prevalent.

Track work is physically hard and dirty by itself. It would be impossible to exclude manual labor from it even with ideally complete mechanization and automation. But under the conditions of the absence of such, plus the shortage of workers in the brigades, one can imagine to what degree this work is hard, particularly for women the share of whom is from 30 to 50 percent in the track brigades.

What happens is the instructions for the operation of equipment and labor safety cannot be followed as there is neither the manpower, the knowledge, the equipment, nor the order. And if a late or early train must be passed through the given tract section, the traffic service, in following the gross indicators, will allow it through to the detriment of the planned preventive work on the track. And hence, the feverish pace of work and risk to life and limb. Alas, Nekrasov's "all the little Russian pieces around the edges" at present is in no way a metaphor.

The bitter plight of the track workers is not relieved either by warm toilets, let alone showers. In the worker quarters at the stages (the so-called service areas) there is stove heating. Having to cut the wood in the open air, one wonders whether to heat or not. There is no organized meal service as this celebration of the flesh is only found at stations (and with our vast expanses!), so that the people must go to work with small bundles as in peasant times. Here as an average, one out of every ten track workers in the provinces (and the larger the number the farther from the cities) cannot even have a civilized wash at home, as he lives in a "barracks" or a structure for several families without elementary conveniences, built slap-dash and located far away from the outside world. As a whole, one out of every three track workers has not solved his housing problem. Of course, there is a roof over his head but this is a roof either of a dormitory, or a communal apartment or a rented room.

In a word, there is every reason for submitting a notice of quitting. All the same, "love for their job" was the second most important (after continuous employment) factor restraining the people from taking such a step as when the respondents were proposed to mention the best job, having chosen between a plant, agriculture, the railroad but not the TF, trade, a cooperative and the TF, 50.0 percent of the track workers in the Yaroslavl Division of the Moscow Railroad and 44.4 percent of the Bologoye Division of the October Railroad chose precisely the track facilities.

The key to fathoming the "mysterious Russian soul" was the information obtained on the question of the influence of train traffic intensity on the various aspects of the activities of track workers. It turned out that the answers to this question depend chiefly upon whether or not the respondents like or do not like the job performed by them as well as their profession. How can one interpret the fact that in

assessing the same conditions, from one- to two-thirds of those questioned (depending upon precisely what was being judged) said "black" and the others said "white"? To what degree do the conditions themselves characterize this?

Not at all. Objectively in Bologoye, the conditions are more complicated where there is the combined freight and express traffic which has been poorly received by the track workers (the famous Auroras between Moscow and Leningrad). However, as in Moscow, from one- to two-thirds of the respondents deny the influence of these conditions on the various aspects of life. If one asks the people to what degree the consumption of various products as food is dangerous for their life, we obtain an affirmative reply only from those who are informed about the content of pesticides, nitrates and so forth in them. The question of working in a zone of heightened danger is analogous. Naturally, the question arises of just who are these optimists?

Correlation analysis of the data has shown that a positive attitude toward the job and profession (that is, what determines the optimism in assessing the influence of traffic intensity), in turn, clearly depends upon the age and education of those questioned. The job and the profession are more to the liking the older the people and the lower their educational level and this is perfectly natural for an area where manual physical labor prevails and which is also well paid for.

No less characteristic for this area is the lack in people of such qualities as responsibility, competence and independence and this we were able to convince ourselves in the course of carrying out the questionnaire poll. In particular, in the second half of the day the questioning was impeded by the presence of intoxicated workers. For many of the track installers and certain repair workers the filling out of the questionnaire involved difficulties although the questions in the questionnaire, in the estimate of experts, were worded with maximum clarity. Often the respondents could not independently handle the questionnaire. We also encountered the inability and fear of expressing a personal opinion. Even the anonymity of the questionnaire could not completely block this trend.

The desire to avoid independence and personal responsibility in the production process, as the questionnaire poll showed, was characteristic for a majority of those questioned. Only one out of four (24.6 percent) in Moscow and one out of three (30.4 percent) in Bologoye noted that they like it more when the assignment is given to each brigade member individually. The remainder prefer to work as an entire brigade in equally sharing the responsibility. Correlation analysis has shown that personal responsibility most frightens people in Moscow over the age of 50 (100 percent) and from 30 to 40 years (80.0 percent), and in Bologoye, for persons over the age of 40 (81.5 percent). Correspondingly, persons under the age of 30 (46.2 percent) do not fear personal responsibility in Moscow, and persons under 40 (33.3 percent) in Bologoye.

A fear of personal responsibility arises when the amount of knowledge and skills for a worker is less than is required by his activity. Thus, it is a question of the skill level and the

indirect indicators of this are confirmed by the direct ones: 28.4 percent of the Muscovites and 21.5 percent of the Bologians pointed directly to the fact that the job performed by them and the skill level do not correspond to one another.

Even more impressive is a comparison of the job and educational structure of the contingent. The share of persons with a higher and specialized secondary education in Bologoye is 35.9 percent and in Moscow 28.2 percent. Some 4.3 percent of the Bologians and 1.3 percent of the Muscovites indicated a primary education. Here 16.7 percent of the Muscovites avoided answering the question about education and this leads one to think that they do not have anything particularly to boast about. Thus, the educational level of the tract workers in Bologoye as a whole is higher than in Moscow. At the same time, the leading positions (the brigade leader, foreman and senior road foreman) comprise 19.7 percent in Bologoye and 28.2 percent in Moscow of the number of persons replying. As we can see, in both instances there is a violating of the professional-skill structure expressed in the fact that subordinates often have a higher educational level than the superiors. This problem is more acute in Moscow where, for example, 36.4 percent of the persons over the age of 50 hold leading positions while only one-half of them, some 18.2 percent, has a higher or specialized secondary education. In Bologoye the ratio is better as here there are fewer superiors over the age of 50 (25.4 percent) and their educational level is higher (16.3 percent of the persons over the age of 50 has a higher or specialized secondary education). There is an analogous situation with the group under the age of 50. In Moscow, their share among the superiors is 9.1 percent, while 4.5 percent have an education; in Bologoye, respectively, 11.1 percent and 12.2 percent of the number of persons replying. The best ratio for these features is found in Moscow for workers under the age of 30 and in Bologoye for workers not over the age of 40. As we should recall, characteristic of precisely these groups is a positive attitude toward independence and responsibility.

That is, precisely they are more essential than the others for the TF and they to a greater degree act as a yeast of instability in their collectives, as they do not like their job. Contrary to the opinion widespread among the ministerial officials that the "poor" personnel act as the source of turnover, it is precisely they who have remained fixed in the TF. These are unskilled workers, often little literate, and not only the elderly but also the incompletely schooled young who, in receiving a wage amounting to the salary of a candidate of science, have lost any incentive for further education.

No one has any incentive for job growth. The TF are an example of how the normalization of the vocational-skill structure is blocked "from below." Probably, any economic sector is characterized by the fact that the closer to the direct object of activity, that is, the more concrete the responsibility for the undertaking, the lower down the sectorial hierarchical ladder the layer of workers not interested in such normalization descends. In our case—on the most terrestrial level—everyone prefers to work as ordinary

workers. Even the skilled and the educated make no effort to become masters and brigade leaders. And when they are summoned, how they can resist.

Among the track workers on this question there is an unanimous opinion: "Why the devil take additional responsibility for the same wage!" This is only partially valid, since with the introduction of the brigade contract and the distribution of earnings according to the labor participation coefficient calculated at the brigade member meetings, there have been more frequent instances when the brigade leaders have received less than the ordinary workers for the very reason that "to lead is not to put down sleepers."

The position of a leader in the TF absolutely does not provide any advantages. On the contrary, it entails merely unbelievable difficulties. The balance of rights and duties of a brigade leader for foreman has been raised to an absurd level. He is up to his ears in obligations and responsibility: he can be awakened at night upon an alarm, thrown into prison, various amounts can be deducted from his wages as penalties for an accident on the rail section assigned to him (incidentally, an amount which is important only for a family budget but not at all for a railroad as this would be a drop in the bucket). And of his rights, there is only one and that is by any method to lead his brigade into the breach and overtime. That is it. Incidentally, there are not even the elementary conditions which would make it possible not to bring things to the point of an accident as a track leader in material and technical terms is unarmed and in social terms is absolutely defenseless. In a word, one can understand why people do not want to be leaders. However, regardless of the fact that leading positions are vacant more often, there are brigade leaders and foremen in the TF. In order to understand these working leaders, we must make a slight historical digression. At the end of the last century and the beginning of the present one, the high prestige of a track worker was determined by the rapid railroad construction and the closely linked economic rise of Russia. In Soviet times, the rate of such construction has strongly declined, however the profession of a track worker has still not lost its rating.

Initially, work in the track system was naturally manual and physical. The arrival of the era of the scientific and technical revolution (after the war) did not bring about fundamental changes in the nature of the labor, however this did not shake the respectful attitude both for tract work and for the track workers themselves. The question was that in their mass the track workers were residents of the villages located along the railroad embankment. The situation was mutually advantageous as the track worker brought well-being, benefits and respect into a family engaged in agricultural labor. The railroad in the person of such a track worker had a thrifty boss who had his roots in the given locality, who valued his job, in a word, a professionally and humanly reliable worker as well as his son being trained as a replacement. And so, due to this track worker with peasant roots, not only was the state of the railroad maintained on a proper level but also the impression was created of the naturalness of such a state of affairs whereby without investing anything additional into the TF, the road had everything it needed.

However, the announcement of the policy of eliminating the unpromising villages, and this more involved the Russian Nonchernozem Zone and its implementation destroyed this situation which was generally to the liking of all. The decimation of the villages meant a truly universal disaster for the railroad. Who would keep an eye on the track sections which were remote from the large population points? There was either no one or someone who had not been hired for work in other places. The TF became one of the rare places in our country where it was possible to hire persons without a residence permit. The contingent of track workers was radically changed and the lumpen arrived. The lumpenization of the personnel was a natural result of the distorted economy. But in the TF, this did not occur gradually, as in the other sectors, but in a single instant, all at once. And here a select lumpen was assembled, that is, those without roots. Of course, the new track workers were not capable of doing what had been the ordinary for the "old ones." Also, they were in short supply. There was an increased need for equipment as this policy had been announced in the 1960s. For this reason, they began to get rid of inconvenient—and there were such—critically thinking professionals from the former workers. Mechanization did not succeed on the planned scale. Those who had left did not come back and the TF began to recruit anybody it could. Thus, the renewal of the contingent of track workers was concluded.

The established contingent no longer compensated for the unsatisfactory nature of the job by increased responsibility, discipline or capacity for work but rather fully harmonized with this. As one drew closer to the cities where there were more opportunities for finding work, in this contingent there was an increased number of persons with a primary education, without roots, without families, with a dubious past and present as we have already partially seen.

To call things by their real names, it must be admitted that to lead such workers was a substantial punishment which actually was not within the capacity of everyone. Here in addition to competence one had to have a particular type of personality with firmness, self-discipline, a well-developed volitional principle, an inclination for leadership, tenacity and the ability to apply pressure—as otherwise no one would make a move. It must be said that in the TF there are such leaders. It relies on them. It is a different matter that they, as a rule, are the vestiges of the old guard, those very "sons" raised by the personal example of strong fathers. In 5-10 years they will retire on their pension and there will be no worthy replacement. It will be unbelievably difficult for the educated leaders who are younger as their mettle is not the same and it is harder to establish authority. The young specialists who have come to the TF under job distribution after the VUZ generally consider themselves to be foreign bodies (and rightly so!) and are merely waiting or do not wait to the end of their 3-year term.

Good, strong leaders have not taken root here. They do exist, but this is due not to professional interest, not to the high wages and not to the advantages or not the honor, but only their personal morality. These are people who reason according to the principle "who if not I" and they are

irreplaceable. But this means that the current problems in the TF are not the limit and when such leaders depart, things will be even worse.

In relation to the leadership problems, one cannot help but mention the negative consequences of the ubiquitous spread of the Belorussian method which has been good in Belorussia, where it was born naturally and has provided healthy fruit. But in the process of its artificial implantation, as is often the case, problems have arisen. They began to reduce not the girls from the road administration but also the completely unprotected hard workers and brigade leaders with the foreman. After the foreman had spent some time as simple workers, when they began to correct the consequences of the "universal distribution," they still did not want to go back as the money would be the same but the responsibility would be beyond comparison. And who would blame them for this? The very fact of the problems, incidentally, is also an indicator of lumpenization with the organically inherent inability to have and defend one's own opinion. Both in Bologoye and in Moscow from the very outset they realized all the lethality of the venture but, nevertheless, reported on victories in the combating of excess manpower under the conditions of its actual deficit.

Thus, the prevalence of manual labor in the TF has led to a situation where here you find basically unskilled, uneducated workers who shirk responsibility and who receive money not for their labor (the cost of such labor is very low) but rather for the working conditions and are in fact on a state subsidy. As a result, the lumpen views of the track workers are preserved and a desire to work less and earn more becomes the dominant feature of life.

Those who remain in the TF over time will develop into their own labor collectives or brigades worn down by the hard work and not provided with elementary conveniences. And so they will live, without waiting for a better lot, fearing the changes, bowing before any superiors with the exception of their own brigade leader, voting for whom they are told and hiding behind the saving collective "we" from the hostile external world as well as from their own isolation and problems. On the other hand, both the passengers as well as the leaders of the sector will be confident that in track work no one would show the initiative for a strike or other outbursts of class self-awareness.

The closer to the industrial centers, the more intense the renewal of personnel in the tract brigades, averaging some one-third. The stable core is made up of men and women of pension and prepension age who for hard work receive over 300 rubles a month. It is precisely they who generate the "swarm" principle. And this principle is backed up by the "wage leveling" which, regardless of all the brigade and other contracts, is alive and even unites such collectives. Although out loud they condemn it, the notion of destroying the leveling principles of distribution instills terror in the "nuclear" levels of track workers.

Distribution relations in the labor process are most significant for any Soviet person and for this reason one must not

overlook this sphere in the life of the track workers, particularly as the wages, along with a love for their job, is the second most important factor keeping people from leaving the TF.

First of all, let us point out that two-thirds of all the track workers questioned by us prefer the job, contractual forms of wages with the distribution of earnings according to a labor participation coefficient between the brigade members. The preference for such a form of time or piece wages shows confidence in one's own forces ("I am no worse than the others") and arising on a basis of subjective notions of the demands of production for the worker. This is determined first of all by the fact that the current tasks of the TF can be carried out without the use of skilled labor and special knowledge. As they say, experience is enough. All the same, the level of such confidence, according to the data of our research, does vary, depending upon sex, age, position and education.

The lowest confidence in their forces is characteristic in Bologoye of persons under the age of 30 and over 50, for workers of other professions and persons with a primary and secondary education. In Moscow, this is true for persons over 40, for workers of other (different) professions and for persons with a primary education (these same lumpenized strata!).

Now about the distribution of bonuses. Here it is essential to bear in mind that it is a matter of additional remuneration which depends upon the specific results of labor and, most importantly, upon the recognition of these by the leadership. Judging from the data of other research, the claims for the distribution of bonuses are always higher than on the distribution of the main part of the earnings which is frequently rigidly tied to the personnel schedule. In our research, this pattern was only partially apparent: the claims on the distribution of bonuses were higher than the claims on wages in Moscow only in the group under the age of 30 and in Bologoye in all the age groups with the exception of the group of persons over the age of 50. This is most interesting information! What is concealed behind the greater satisfaction with bonuses in comparison with wages? Only the fact that the management thus "feeds" the more lumpenized strata of track workers in order to somehow level out the difference in the basic wages. This, of course, is a forced measure related to the fact that the lumpen will not accept anything except wage leveling. It does not show any respect for skilled, intelligent, leading labor and the higher earnings of some with less dirty work evoke in it not a desire to grow up to such a level but rather hostility and even hate for the engineers and technicians and specialists generally.

Under the existing conditions, the leaders of the TF have no other method of keeping "civil peace" except to grant large amounts to the less worthy. In helping to manage the lumpen, the leveling distribution puts the skilled personnel in an unjust situation (not to mention that it perverts the unskilled) and thereby largely nullifies the incentive role of wages.

If one takes a broader view of the problem of distribution—not so much as distribution between the workers of the TF

but rather the possession of social goods in life—a no-way gloomy picture presents itself.

The housing situation scarcely distinguishes the TF against the general background in the nation. The worst off (in dormitories or barracks) are the divorced and single persons (in Bologoye some 43.7 percent is bachelors and one out of five is divorced; in Moscow, one out of three is a bachelor and one out of five divorced). Here if it is considered that at least one-third came into the TF as a result of migration, one would be surprised by how the people generally have been able to make their way. Of course, the barracks are a disgrace for the end of the 20th Century. Certainly housing construction must be intensified. However, the role of the housing problem for the functioning of the TF is exaggerated. In the desire to justify the difficulties of the TF by this problem one can see a wish to escape from a solution to a truly urgent task of providing a qualitative change in the nature of labor and to explain the warping of the social sphere by a housing shortage.

The data of the expert poll conducted in Bologoye make it possible to assert that the standard of living of the track workers is rather high. Such domestic articles as a stove (electric or gas), refrigerator, washing machine, TV set, including colored, tape recorder or player, sewing machine and vacuum are possessed by virtually everyone. Almost every family has either a bicycle or a motorcycle and motor vehicles are also encountered. In a word, the supply of such things is generally higher than, for example, among the average Moscow intelligentsia. The experts were asked how they assessed the situation (the summer of 1989) as far as housing, food, clothing and material prosperity as a whole in comparison with what existed 5 years ago. In terms of the entire aggregate of replies, we received only two negative views (things as a whole had gotten worse with material supply), and in one instance this was due to the birth of a child and in the other to a demotion.

What actually is not to their liking is the everyday working conditions. For 42.1 percent of the Bologians and 38.1 percent of the Muscovites, this is the crucial factor in a possible change of jobs. And in actual terms a majority of the track workers receive their salary precisely for this. If they received it according to labor, the salary would be miniscule. The solid amounts of the current earnings are in essence an additional payment for the working conditions. The track workers themselves are perfectly aware of this and they do not grumble about the major issue. Salary questions begin to be heard in their words when the issue is raised of additional earnings or the allocation of certain scarce items which, alas, include food.

Certainly, the standard of living of the track workers is achieved not by the productivity of their labor but rather from the state subsidies, that is, by confiscating funds from the more productive sectors. As a result it is not society that owes the track facilities but rather the other way round. For this reason, incidentally, an increase in the fares for transport services is not right. But this circumstance is no longer recognized. Charity is perceived as something due and this naturally corrupts the recipients.

This must not be understood as if the people are bad. The people in the TF, as usual, are different. The problem is that the conditions and the support of their activities do not help to develop in them either a civil self-awareness, a responsibility or even, strictly speaking, a feeling of human dignity. This is not their fault, but rather their misfortune. A misfortune primarily because with the existing nature of labor in the TF, the enormous richness of human personalities and the professional, creative potentials of the people remain unused. Both the people and the undertaking suffer from this. In the expert questionnaire there was a question about happiness. It was proposed that this be judged according to a ten-point scale. Theoretically, happiness is an assessment of one's own fate and an assessment of the level of self-realization. And so just one-third of the experts assessed it at three points. Predominantly, these were persons with a secondary and incomplete secondary education. The remaining two-thirds among which the educated and better-off persons prevailed, gave their happiness a two. As long as the track workers feel unhappy, there is the remaining risk for the passengers and the freight not to arrive at the destination.

As of this year, the railroads have been given economic independence and at the same time the possibility of getting out of the hopeless mess which the central leadership created over the decades. In addition, there is every reason to assume that the process of bidding farewell to administrative stereotypes in the approach to the railroads will last for long years, if the idea of their independence is not discredited sooner. One such stereotype is the moving of the railroad embankment from the center of attention of the leadership to the periphery, the financing, for example, of fantastic plans to the detriment of the TF, and without their normal operation the effectiveness of all the new developments will equal zero.

The modernization of the TF should become a strategic direction in the development of the railroads and the transition from repairing available equipment by dates to repairs on the basis of expert assessments, that is, by necessity, is generally a primary task. At the same time, it is essential to bear in mind that until a principal of transforming activity is formed (delumpenized), no capital investments will help. It is possible to bury the system under equipment and spare parts, but everything will soon stand idle and break down until the people have some incentive to master this equipment. For this reason, on the other hand, it is essential to sharply differentiate wages of the more or less skilled workers in order to substantially raise the prestige of the skilled, including leading, labor and at least to some degree to provide material compensation for the responsibility and risk of the TF leaders. Only in meeting this condition will the subsequent saturation with equipment and automation work for the good of the railroad. It would also be useful to institute personal surpayments for skills (as a temporary measure) and consider this question, like the question of calculating the wages for the brigade leaders, as within the competence of the chief of the section.

On the level of providing social protection for the leading workers of the TF, it is essential to sharply limit the

application of penalty sanctions against them. The grounds for applying them should be only a violating of the job instructions and these, in turn, should be supplemented by a regulation concerning actions in emergency situations.

The carrying out of these measures which in essence are preventive for the actually complete mechanization and automation of track labor will bring about a gradual renewal of the contingent of workers by replacing the less skilled with the more skilled and intelligent. In order to avoid the aggravating of social tension in the TF, it would be advisable to finally lower the pension age of the track workers (for women to the age of 50 and for men to 55); to organize courses for eliminating illiteracy for workers in the mass professions of the TF; use retired specialists as mentors for a certain material remuneration.

The influx of skilled workers into the TF and the modernizing of track labor will naturally contribute to reducing the number of the track worker contingent and to increasing their labor productivity. Only on such a basis can we solve the problems of domestic conditions and housing support as well as the self-realization of the personnel and their normal psychological mood.

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Real Bilingualism in the Ukrainian VUZ
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[Article by N.N. Vnukova and V.N. Leontyeva]

[Text] It is no secret that over the previous decades in our multinational nation there has been an artificial, almost compulsory russification of social life while in the ideological sphere, and particularly on the questions of the education of youth, one has felt a clear trend toward internationalization. The ill-starred slogan of the national form and socialist content of Soviet culture, like the slogan of the "new historical community of people," has in fact meant the loss of national self-awareness and the emasculation of the national content of culture, including artistic and linguistic culture. How can we restore what has been destroyed? At present, this question has assumed the sharpest political edge but daily life and culture-creating processes cannot be described merely by political categories.... For this reason "the problem of a mother tongue" will not be eliminated, in our view, even by the unanimous approval of the text of the Union Treaty.

The commenced return of national languages to the structures of official and unofficial contacts is a process that is both organized and assessed in a very dissimilar manner, it represents a problem and contains a number of essential contradictions. To what degree are these internally and objectively inherent to the proposed measures for the rebirth of the national cultures to serve as a source of development of the latter and not end up an obstacle for their natural reciprocal penetration? Without discussing all the interrelated aspects of the given problem which also ultimately end in the contradiction of "natural" (= free)—

"artificial" (= often compulsory and running contrary to desires and needs), let us take up an analysis of just one of the aspects: bringing out the conditions for switching to the mother tongue of instruction in a higher institution of learning as a factor in the development of national cultures. Since the empirical material used by us for reflection and conclusion describes a situation on a specific territory of our nation—in the Ukraine and then only a part of it—the Kharkov area, the conclusions offered in no way claim universality and this, incidentally, does not mean their "absolute uniqueness" and uselessness in other similar situations, for example, for an analysis of situations in regions with an analogous "distribution" of national languages.

The transition to a unified system of ongoing education in a multinational country, when the republics are adopting laws on state languages, involves a solution to complicated social and culturological problems. Some three-quarters of all the nation's students are studying in the VUZes of the RSFSR and the Ukraine alone. Here the choice of the language of instruction is made by the student himself and in the changing situation the organizational principles of the educational system cannot help but consider the objective requirement of multilingualism; on the territory of an individual republic most usually bilingualism becomes predominant. For this reason, let us examine the question of the conditions for converting to instruction in a VUZ in the maternal national tongue as a problem of real bilingualism.

After two "waves" (in the 1930s and the 1970s) of "deukrainianization," that is, the eliminating of the Ukrainian language from the republic's social life, a paradoxical situation has risen there: out of the 50 million Ukrainians, which comprises over 80 percent of the republic's population, 85.7 percent consider Ukrainian their mother tongue, or over 34 million persons; some 48 percent in the cities have a fluent mastery of Russian, and in the countryside the figure is 25.1 percent [1, part 3, p 23]. At the same time, over a larger portion of the Ukraine's territory, Russian has actually been the language of the official documents and official proceedings up to the adoption of the USSR Law on the State Language. This possibly has been nowhere as clear as in the Ukrainian VUZes, where the Ukrainian language has virtually been absent as in the main republic cultural VUZes only 8 percent of the instructors are fluent in the language and this percentage is even lower in the technical VUZes.

On the social level such an unequal status of the Russian and Ukrainian languages gives rise to neglect of the mother tongue and to national nihilism. Moreover, such an artificial downplaying of the national language ends up in being a medium for nationalism both by the Russians "by blood" as well as by the Ukrainians. On the linguistic level, this has led to the spread as a conversational language of so-called "surzhik" [patois] or a Russian-Ukrainian speech caused by the interference of the linguistic structures and very remote both from the Ukrainian and Russian literary languages. For this reason, at present there is the difficult task not only of restoring the culture of Ukrainian speech but also raising

the culture of Russian speech. Without these mutual processes it is impossible to expect a "flourishing culture" of international contact and this is extremely important as a culture of intercommunication and the mutual development of cultures more and more is recognized as the leading method for the modern development of human individuality. For this reason, it is possible to recognize as an essential and possibly the main feature in the formation of a culture the actual appearance of a "dialogue" of cultures, or if you like their equal and reciprocal coexistence. In terms of the Ukrainian and Russian cultures in the Kharkov area, for example, this cannot be said as in the oblast, out of the 184 theater collectives of the trade union and the 63 amateur groups of the state system only *one* collective is a national one and that is the Ukrainian People's Dramatic Theater of the Palace of Culture at the Metallist Plant. A sociological study conducted in 1990 at the Kharkov Engineering-Economics Institute showed that only 37.4 percent of the students fluent in Ukrainian read artistic literature in Ukrainian (in truth, the questionnaire did not specify precisely what literature this was, that is, original works by Ukrainian authors or that translated into Ukrainian from other languages), and these were joined by another 5.9 percent of those questioned who were not fluent in Ukrainian for conversation. Periodicals in Ukrainian were read daily or regularly only by one-third (34.8 percent) of the respondents. Consequently, over one-half of the questioned students did not read at all in Ukrainian and there were virtually no textbooks for them [2, pp 3-4]; some 61.7 percent of the students considered themselves fluent in Ukrainian for conversational speech. (The research established that 57.6 percent of those questioned could speak Ukrainian.) These figures also show the generally low interest in Ukrainian-language literature regardless of a knowledge of the language. Also indicative is the fact that almost 46 percent of those questioned could not mention a single Ukrainian writer, although the questionnaires mentioned 41 names of Ukrainian masters of the literary word (considering the cases when the respondent, having replied in the negative to questions concerning his mastery of oral Ukrainian and the reading of literature in Ukrainian, nevertheless demonstrated a certain familiarity with modern Ukrainian literature). One out of four persons polled knew only A. Gonchar, B. Oleynik, and P. Zagrebelnyy; 4 percent of those polled knew I. Drach and D. Pavlychko (that is, those who recently have taken an active part in political activities); the names of the remainder were mentioned once (in one questionnaire for one name). This shows a clearly weak linkage of interest among the young people with national literature; but a rather representative "general list" of 41 names of Ukrainian writers from the Soviet period provides hope that with a correctly organized cultural policy the viewpoint of the students can be broadened.

In the designated situation, the first step on the way to the rebirth of Ukrainian culture among the student youth can be a transition to instruction in Ukrainian.

Close attention must be paid to the fact that 25 percent of the questioned students residing on Ukrainian territory for more than 10 years do not have a mastery of Ukrainian and 37.5 percent of them are Ukrainians by nationality.

Since the students at the KhIEI [Kharkov Engineer-Economics Institute] are residents of not only the Ukraine and its graduates have a Union-wide distribution, we feel it of interest to describe in greater detail certain facts and dependences established as a result of the questionnaire on converting to the Ukrainian language for instruction (the conclusions from this research confirm our supposition on the need for real bilingualism in the VUZes of the Ukrainian Republic). The questionnaire covered over 500 students from all the faculties of the daytime and evening divisions of years 1-3 and this was around one-third of the total number of students. The sample made can be considered representative, since a sampling of 200 observations would be sufficiently representative for a probability of 95 percent and an accuracy of 0.1. The questionnaire contained 15 questions.

In the first place, we determined the degree that the students desired to switch to the Ukrainian language for instruction (the wording of the question on the questionnaire: "as of the next academic year") and the dependence of this upon nationality and oral fluency in the language. Only 7.7 percent of those questioned desired to switch to Ukrainian,

and five-sixths of them were students in the daytime department and one-fifth were students of the evening department. Ukrainians comprised 87 percent of those expressing a desire to study in Ukrainian and the remainder was representatives of other nationalities (the daytime department). They feel that this should be linked to maintaining the national culture and the establishing of statedom. Those not desiring to switch to the Ukrainian language for instruction are both those who do not have a verbal fluency with 41.4 percent of the total number of those questioned as well as those who freely speak Ukrainian (their number was even greater with 46.8 percent of the total number). Among those not desiring to continue instruction in Ukrainian the Ukrainians made up 43 percent and this also shows an insufficient linkage of the interests of the student youth with the development of a national culture. As was apparent as a result of the research, the mastery of the language has a greater influence on the desire to switch to the Ukrainian language for instruction than does nationality.

Secondly, we traced the influence of basic school knowledge and the conversational mastery of Ukrainian on the assessment by the students of their ability to continue instruction in Ukrainian. This possibility was viewed in the following manner (Table 1).

Table 1: The Possibility of Switching to the Ukrainian Language for Instruction, %

	Verbal Fluency in Ukrainian		Not Verbally Fluent in Ukrainian		
Variations	In School		In School		Total, %
	Studied	Did Not Study	Studied	Did Not Study	
Could immediately	10.8	—	0.2	—	11.0
Could with certain difficulty	24.0	1.2	3.0	2.9	32.1
Could with great difficulty	16.0	0.8	6.4	6.0	29.2
Could not at all	7.4	1.0	8.9	10.3	27.6
Total					100.0

As can be seen from Table 1, 77.7 percent of those questioned had studied the Ukrainian language in school; they assessed their possibility of converting to the Ukrainian language for instruction as a whole affirmatively, although a portion of them felt this would involve significant difficulties or 72.3 percent. Some 11 percent asserted that they would be able to switch immediately to the Ukrainian language for instruction, and they had all studied it in school (although on one questionnaire it was asserted that the transition was possible immediately but the respondent did not have a conversational mastery of Ukrainian). Some 27.6 percent of those questioned said they would not be able to switch to Ukrainian language for instruction at all, and of this number over two-fifths had not studied the language in school (basically these were students from the daytime division who had come to Kharkov from other republics). There is the dubious assessment of the impossibility of switching to the Ukrainian language for instruction among 7.4 percent of those questioned who were fluent in the language and had studied it in school.

Regardless of the fact that a predominant majority of those questioned had studied Ukrainian in school, only 3.1 percent upon being admitted to the institute had written a composition in Ukrainian, they all conversed freely in Ukrainian, they could draw up a document in the Ukrainian language and considered it possible to switch immediately to the Ukrainian language in instruction. However, the table indicates that the study of a national language in school is not a guarantee for the possibility of obtaining a higher education in this language.

Thirdly, a correlation was established between the desire of the students to switch to the Ukrainian language for instruction and the view of their ability to do this as of those desiring instruction in Ukrainian, 50 percent replied that they could switch immediately, 48 percent said they could with difficulty and 2 percent replied that they could not do this although they wanted to.

Fourthly, we assessed the need for the knowledge of Ukrainian after completing the institute, "for the future specialty," including among representatives of other nationalities (Table 2).

Table 2: Need for a Knowledge of the Language, %

Variations	Ukrainians	Other Nationalities
Would need to have perfect knowledge	7.8	2.1
Would need to know professional vocabulary and "specialty language"	8.5	5.5
Necessary to have conversational language	10.1	8.9
Understanding of speech sufficient	14.6	14.9
Knowledge of language not needed at all	8.5	19.1

As we can see from Table 2, along nationality lines there are differences in the assessment of the need to know Ukrainian from the necessity of a perfect knowledge of it to the absence of any need, while approximately all the nationalities take the same view of the overall need for a knowledge of the national language: 33.2 percent of the Ukrainians and 29.3 percent of the representatives of the other nationalities. Among those desiring to study in Ukrainian, the need for a knowledge of it for a future specialty is viewed in the following manner: 59.3 percent feel that it will be necessary to have a perfect knowledge of the language; 15.2 percent say the "specialty language"; 11.8 percent feel a mastery of conversational speech is enough; 10.1 percent an understanding of conversation; 3.4 percent feel that there is no need for the Ukrainian language upon completing the VUZ. Among those who do not wish to study in Ukrainian, the distribution of the assessment of the need runs in the opposite direction: 6.9 percent feel it is necessary to have a perfect mastery, 13.8 percent prefer the "specialty language," 51.5 percent want an understanding of conversation and to be able to converse, while 28.2 percent feel there is no need for a knowledge of Ukrainian.

In considering that almost one-quarter of the students questioned was inclined to consider it a necessity to have a perfect knowledge of Ukrainian and a knowledge of the "specialty language," it is essential to consider the necessity of changing the organization of the training process, namely: the introduction of real bilingualism, the parallel giving of courses in Ukrainian and Russian, the publishing of educational literature in the two languages, the systematic study of the Ukrainian language (at the institute a chair of Ukrainian language has been formed) both by the students and the instructors of the VUZ. It was concluded that there is an objective opportunity to switch a portion of the students who are conversationally fluent in Ukrainian to the Ukrainian language for instruction.

Real bilingualism is that form of returning the national language to the republic's VUZes whereby they consider the

significant difficulty of converting to instruction in the national language for a rather large portion of the students (in our research their number was 61.3 percent). In any event, the free choice of the language of instruction should remain with the students themselves and in early childhood this should be the choice of the parents. In any event, it must also not be forgotten that not the nations, not the languages, and not the cultures "in and of themselves" are the end of history but rather the free cultivated man who creates his own *life-in-culture*.

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Justice in the Eyes of the Condemned

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[Article by V.P. Kotin]

[Text] The problems of justice have recently become a matter of increased attention among the public. Gradually, the curtain of secrecy is falling away from them and instead one finds an interest and an unfeigned desire to understand. In this context it is valid to turn directly to the condemned persons in the aim of obtaining data making it possible to determine new, possibly unexpected directions in the activities of the law enforcement bodies, not to say that a sociological poll can be employed as an effective means for viewing the causality, latency and other aspects of crime.

We polled 327 men who had basically been condemned for severe crimes and who had served their sentence in special harsh-condition colonies. Of this number, 42 percent was under the age of 25 and 48 percent from 25 to 50. In terms of the nature of crimes committed there was a predominance of violent criminals with 54 percent and mercenary criminals with 30 percent.

The obtained data did not show any particular discrepancies in the judgments depending upon the categories of the prisoners. Clearly, this is explained by the fact that often violent offenders had previously been convicted for mercenary crimes and vice versa, that is, in its mass the contingent is rather homogeneous. It is not to be excluded that a certain leveling could also occur as a consequence of the extended stay in places of incarceration as 79 percent had a sentence

of more than 3 years. In line with this, the natural question arises of what more determines the attitude of the prisoners to various questions, that is, personal motivation or stereotypes and the mores of the criminal world?

It is not easy to give a standard answer. Particularly, as the research shows, since the prisoners frequently resort to group standards and rules as an unique method of psychological defense. Something else must also be considered: the offer of "wallowing" in the strictly personal and to recall the difficult minutes of the investigation and court can evoke negative emotions.

In order to exclude or at least in some way mitigate the influence of these factors, the persons being questioned were asked general questions, and it was proposed that they give an "independent" assessment for various legal phenomena and the attitude was established to emotionally neutral problems. For example, an absolute majority (93 percent) gave an affirmative answer to the question "do you wish to have a better knowledge of criminal legislation?" And here the reasons for the understanding vary. Some 26 percent (basically the youth) feel that they would not have committed the crime. For one-quarter of those questioned a knowledge of the laws would not have influenced the committing of the crime in any manner. A significant portion (47 percent) would have liked a knowledge of legislation in order to use this knowledge against the court and investigatory bodies or for concealing the crime.

In taking a varying view of their criminal past, an absolute majority of the prisoners felt, however, that they had fallen into places of incarceration due to a random coinciding of circumstances, because of major personal mistakes or legal ignorance. With certain qualifications it can be said that such a mind set was shaped in the course of the investigation and the court and to a certain degree the law enforcement bodies themselves are to be blamed for this. In any event, 80 percent of those questioned were certain that neither the investigator nor the court had even endeavored to establish the real reasons and causes for the committed crime. Moreover, only 13 percent felt that all the circumstances of their criminal activity had been established. In the remaining instances, either all the accomplices had not been discovered or other crimes had not been disclosed.

From the viewpoint of preventing recidivism, the presence of such views among the prisoners is a quite negative factor. As is known, one is restrained from committing a crime not so much by the severity of the possible punishment as by the probability of disclosure. And here one must note that recently in the press a number of materials has appeared where it asserts that the state of crime is in no way tied to the activities of the law enforcement bodies. Such assertions can only be explained by the ever-growing confusion caused by the exacerbation of social tension and the sharp rise in crime. Clearly, such a linkage does exist. The state, level and dynamics of crime depend directly upon the activities of these bodies and not only upon the quantitative characteristics (effectiveness, available technical equipment, legal support and so forth) but also upon their moral basis.

In this context we have focused our attention to the educational role of justice. Certainly here we must not rely completely on the subjective views of the participants in the court process. However, certain figures are of interest. Thus, 25 percent of the prisoners stated that neither the trial itself nor the persons participating in it had left any particular trace in their memory. The culminating event—the handing down of the sentence—among a majority (64 percent) caused anger and only a few (10 percent) considered it just, while 15 percent remained indifferent. The prisoners recalled: the defense lawyer (24 percent), the investigator (21 percent), the prosecutor (18 percent) and the judge (14 percent). But to the question "Who of the participants in the trial had a positive influence on you?" 71 percent replied negatively. Only a few pointed to the lawyer (24 percent), the judge (5 percent) or the investigator (1 percent).

The persons questioned described the investigator most willingly and in greatest detail. As a whole, his image was a negative one and he caused a feeling of revulsion (21 percent), he was "clever and perfidious" (19 percent), "he lacked intelligence and wits" (11 percent), "he was coarse and applied psychological pressure" (12 percent). No one mentioned any instances of physical compulsion.

The prisoners had a very specific view of the role of the lawyer. On the one hand, as was already pointed out, the lawyer had the highest rating and, on the other, few could count seriously on his help. As a result, only 14 percent themselves chose their lawyer and placed certain hopes on him. In a majority of the instances, he was hired by relatives (36 percent), recommended by the investigator (11 percent) or other persons (fellow cellmates, 3 percent, friends 4 percent and so forth). For one-quarter of the prisoners it was a completely indifferent matter who was to defend them and how and the lawyer participated in their case upon court assignment.

How can one explain such poor interest in legal aid for persons needing it most? On the most general level, the prestige and social importance of defense lawyer activities depends upon the situation which the defense lawyers hold as a social institution in the system of state bodies as well as upon the level of the public's legal culture. Certainly there are many other factors which determine the attitude of various strata of the population to the profession of a lawyer generally and a defense lawyer, in particular. In the given instance, two circumstances were clearly apparent: this was a certain fatal conviction on the part of a majority of the prisoners that nothing could be changed and mistrust in the ability of the defense lawyer as a professional.

In actuality, if we turn to the statistics, we will discover that the number of acquittals in recent years has not exceeded 0.3 percent, while even in the gloomy years of the 1930s and 1940s they were 10 percent [1]. The punitive practice of the courts, according to the official data, remains very harsh, particularly in comparison with the Western countries. For this reason, there is nothing surprising in the fact that two-thirds of the prisoners expressed dissatisfaction with the results of the defense lawyer's participation in the case. Various reasons were given: the lawyer was not interested in the outcome of the case (23 percent), he took a formal

attitude toward his duties (11 percent), the lawyer did not have a real opportunity to provide help (5 percent), the lawyer tried to help but no one listened to him (30 percent) and there was no benefit from the lawyer (9 percent). Other reasons were also given.

One other particular feature in the legal awareness of the prisoners and that was that the activities of the defense lawyer at times were associated with the activities of the law enforcement bodies generally. The lawyer in their mind was not a member of an independent social organization but rather a co-worker in the law enforcement system along with the investigator, judge and prosecutor. Clearly, this circumstance substantially impedes the lawyer's performance of his professional functions (it is harder to establish a psychological contact, to ascertain circumstances of importance for the defense and so forth). In any event, only 42 percent of those questioned could say with certainty that in the course of the investigation and trial they developed good, trusting relations with their defender and they frankly described everything of interest to him. In the remaining instances, judging from the results of the poll, the prisoners had little grasp of the lawyer's possibilities and acted cautiously with him or did not trust him at all.

As a whole, mistrust or even bitterness are the basic features which determine the attitude of the prisoners toward the activities of the law enforcement bodies. And it is precisely the activities—this must be particularly emphasized—since this attitude is rarely personalized. The characteristics given by the prisoners are primarily the attitude toward the professional duties of these persons. For example, few of those questioned recalled the investigator, although precisely his image was shown most completely and uniformly in the reports.

All of this can show the presence of persistent stereotypes in the legal awareness of the prisoners. A uniformly negative attitude among a majority of them to justice and to the other bodies combating crime can form under the influence of the ethical standards of the criminal world or as a consequence of the distorted perception of legal realities. Among a majority (59 percent), the view of the law enforcement bodies after the investigation and trial deteriorated (it improved for 4 percent). Only a few (5 percent) believed in the justice of our legal system. The basic mass of prisoners either doubted (25 percent) or did not believe at all that the court could hand down an objective sentence (63 percent).

It is worthy of note that one-half of those questioned linked justice with the independence of the court and with its ability to hand down a decision considering all the circumstances of the case. One-third linked this concept with the period of the sentence. Only a few (8 percent) were ready to agree that a sentence could be a means of rectification and reeducation. An absolute majority considers a sentence primarily as a punishment or revenge by the state, they either do not find any positive content in the sentence or consider it completely senseless (the latter is particularly characteristic for violent criminals).

There is nothing unexpected in the fact that the attitude of the prisoners toward justice is biased. The problem is rather

something else: often the lawyers themselves do not expect any other attitude toward themselves on the part of the lawbreakers and assume that the latter are simply incapable of an objective perception of the purpose of law enforcement activities. Such attitudes create additional difficulties in their work and often lead to conflicts. However, experienced lawyers, as a rule, take an understanding attitude toward the emotional state of the lawbreakers and endeavor to overcome the alienation and hostility on their part.

The rejection by the prisoners of the goals and methods of criminal justice to a certain degree is a consequence of the negative attitude toward it among the public. This is natural. The well-known modern American lawyer, Lloyd L. Weinreb, has written that the criminal process is among those inevitable phenomena of our life which must be tolerated. Even when we are convinced that justice has been performed, the condemnation of a criminal is not a happy event. For this reason, there is nothing surprising in the fact that our methods do not fully satisfy anyone [2]. At times, such dissatisfaction assumes the nature of a campaign and in the mass information media there appears a flood of sensational revelations of instances of corruption and abuse. As a rule, this intensifies passions among the prisoners, it heightens tension in places of incarceration and even leads to various forms of social protest against the bodies combating crime.

Nevertheless, the data obtained in the course of the research make it possible to conclude that the negative attitude among the criminals toward justice does not contain its sweeping negation. With all the unpleasantness of the modern methods of combating crime and with the presence of persistent stereotypes, a significant portion of the prisoners has an individual system of views and judgments concerning the legal phenomena and social institutions. This reaffirms the view that the measures of rehabilitation and reeducation can and should achieve their goal. On the other hand, the actions of the law enforcement bodies, no matter how validly rigid they are, should not only conform precisely to the law but also be based upon that moral, humanitarian basis only on which it is possible to achieve any positive results.

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